International Relations

• Classical Approaches: ‘The chief purpose of the study of international relations is to understand the consequences of international anarchy.’ Do you agree?

  I disagree to an extent that the chief purpose of the study of international relations is to understand the consequences of international anarchy, i.e. the view that the world lacks any supreme authority over nations. I argue that the primary purpose of studying international relations should encompass a broader understanding of state/non-state-actor interactions and systemic dynamics, rather than being limited to the consequences of international anarchy.

  While it is true that international anarchy is widely accepted to be true under all three main schools of thought, and is a clearly meritable and valuable foundational perspective in the realm of international relations, reduction of international relations to focusing only on the consequences of international anarchy, while perhaps plausible, is inherently too reductive. I propose that my preferred explanation for the purpose of study of international relations is to gain an accurate understanding of not only the consequences of their interactions, but also how key actors interact, and understanding the nature of the system under which they interact. It may be refuted that consequences can remain the chief purpose of study above the mechanisms (the ‘hows’) and systemic nature of interaction; yet I would generally caution against the reductiveness of the statement without taking time to evaluate and challenge assumptions, and would prefer a broader framework to understanding the purpose of study.

  I will first explain international anarchy and why it holds true, or is widely regarded to hold true by the major schools of thought in international relations. I will pose a brief challenge to international anarchy as a foundational underpinning assumption, but ultimately (marginally) refute the challenge. I will then understand what the study of international relations is and what is involved in it, coming to the proposal of my preferred explanation. I will explore the challenge to my proposed explanation that consequences can remain the chief purpose of study, but ultimately arrive at the conclusion that ‘consequences of international anarchy’ is unsatisfying as a chief purpose, although with its validities and value.

  ***

  International anarchy is the notion that there exists no overarching authority that enforces rules or maintains order among states − unlike domestic politics, where a sovereign authority exists, the international system lacks such a structure. Donnelly defines anarchy as ‘the absence of hierarchical relations of authority and rule’. While Kenneth Waltz defines anarchy as a condition of possibility for, or ‘permissive’ cause of war, Donnelly however suggests that ‘the absence of hierarchical order need not lead to a Hobbesian war of all against all.

  Under the international system, (sovereign) states are the key actors, all of whom possess the right to self-govern in absence of internal interference. When there is no sovereign state under anarchy, states must rely on themselves for security and survival, leading to a self-help mentality where states prioritize their own interests and security in a decentralized manner: ‘threats, retaliation, negotiation, and similar means mobilized by states on their own  behalf’ (Donnelly). The self-help mentality, in absence of interference ‘from above’, fosters a competitive atmosphere between states for power and resources, which propels conflict or the formation of alliances, and causes shifts in power dynamics. This creates uncertainty, as states cannot be certain of others' intentions − which can lead to a security dilemma, where one state's efforts to increase its security may inadvertently threaten others.

  International anarchy is surely widely accepted to be true: all three primary schools of international relations are congruent with international anarchy. Realism is essentially the view that all states are self-centered and act on self-interest (in other words the assumption of egoism) − imagine the state of nature, but in the international realm. Liberalism is essentially the challenge to the egoism assumption, or rather a proof of the possibility of mutual gain through cooperation − imagine the social contract theory wherein actors are states. The English School, somewhat of a blend between realism and liberalism, essentially holds that countries live in a ‘society’, but an international one where states are the ‘people’. This society is in absence of a central government (so anarchy holds) but has basically everything else that a society has: norms, values, institutions, which keeps people in check.

  There exists significant variations in how each view presents the international system, but all of them believe that fundamentally international anarchy is true: reason being that by the Weberian definition of the state, there isn't really some central state that can monopolize the legitimate use of power over the international system.

  But is international anarchy true or an accurate reflection of reality? Yes, but to an extent: in that it may be possible that international institutions, treaties, etc. can attempt to ‘replace’ the functions of the state. Zarakol and Mattern argue that hierarchical structures significantly shape interactions in world politics, highlighting that power dynamics and organized inequalities among various actors complicate the notion of a purely anarchic system. Whether such attempts at ‘replacing’ the state are successful, or if it is even at odds with international anarchy, is to be further contested.

  The most prominent example of attempts of establishing some form of state-replacing structure in the international realm is the attempt to establish a ‘liberal global order’, which is the framework established post-Cold War, where international organizations, treaties, and norms work to create a more stable and cooperative international environment, despite the underlying anarchy. (An ‘order’ is an organized group of international institutions that help govern the interactions among the member states (Mearsheimer).) While these organizations do not replace the state, they can help mitigate the effects of anarchy by promoting cooperation and establishing rules.

  Yet Mearsheimer challenges the success of the liberal global order, claiming it is said to have been crumbling by 2019, and that it was flawed from the start and thus destined to fail for the following reasons: (1) the spread of nationalism and its emphasis on self-determination overrode the spread of liberal democracy; (2) as the spread of liberal democracy originates from the US, some targeted states may resist foreign efforts out of self-protection; (3) the liberal order, calling for substantial decision-making authority to be delegated to international institutions and allowing free movement of refugees/immigrants across borders, is often seen as too demanding of states’ authority. In other words, the egoist, self-protecting assumptions of the realist view overpowers that of the liberalist, in that practical attempts at coordination have limited effects and sustainability.

  Secondly, whether this counts as a challenge to international anarchy is contested as well. Individuals and social groups often order and organize themselves in the absence of government’, but that this order is established ‘horizontally’ rather than ‘vertically’; through the interaction of formally equal states rather than being imposed ‘from above’ (Donnelly). This further explains why liberalism and the English School, albeit a counterview to realism, is not incongruent with anarchy: it posits that these orders are horizontally organized and so not necessarily a hierarchical, top-down structure, which is a requirement in order to disprove international anarchy.

  The consequences of anarchy include the prevalence of war, the formation of alliances, and the emphasis on military power. For example, the outbreak of World War I demonstrates how (pre-League of Nations) anarchic conditions can lead to widespread conflict due to states acting on self-serving nationalistic fervour with the aid of military mobilization. Furthermore, alliances such as NATO illustrate how states band together to counterbalance perceived threats, reflecting a collective response to the uncertainties inherent in an anarchic system. The prevalence of war and the formation of alliances necessitate strategies for survival, leading to the emergence of balance of power theory. This key realist concept posits that states can ensure their survival by preventing any one state from becoming too powerful; states, motivated by self-interest and a desire for security, form alliances to counterbalance perceived threats. In this way, the anarchic environment compels states to act collectively to mitigate the dangers posed by stronger adversaries. Yet widely academically influential as the theory is, Hui et al. challenge whether this balance of power can be statistically or systemically tested, as their findings, for eight multi-state systems across 2000 years of world history, are inconsistent with any theory that predicts a tendency of international systems toward balance. This raises important questions about the reliability of states' strategies in an anarchic world.

  ***

  What is involved in the study of international relations? I will summarize the study of international relations as understanding the interaction between key actors in the international system: states, international organizations (e.g. UN - formerly League of Nations, WTO, regional organizations such as EU, etc. that facilitate cooperation and governance), non-state actors (e.g. MNCs, NGOs, terrorist groups, any groups with substantial influence) and transnational actors (operates across national borders e.g. advocacy groups and social movements); viewed through the lenses of the following (non-exhaustive) theoretical approaches: realism, liberalism and the English School (closely related to constructivism) (etc). The purpose of the study of international relations is to gain an accurate understanding of how key actors interact, the nature of the system under which they interact, and the consequences of their interactions. 

  Understanding how key actors interact can involve questions such as whether states are driven by rational calculations of self-interest (as per rational choice theory), or by emotions or human-nature responses such as fear, honour and interest (Donnelly), especially as posited by biological realists. Additionally, the influence of non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and terrorist groups, are not negligible from the investigation of key-actor dynamics. Understanding the nature of the system, while predominantly characterized by anarchy, diverges into various theoretical interpretations, from the self-help, security and survival, competition-oriented realism to the recognition of the importance of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye) in liberal or constructivist schools of thought, to whether cooperation is reinforced by norms, institutions, etc. or a complex mixture. Finally, the consequences of interactions can manifest in various forms, from competition leading to conflict (ex. the two World Wars), to efforts at resolution through diplomacy and international agreements (ex. the formation of NATO or the League of Nations). Understanding these consequences involves considering the factors leading to their successes or failures, as well as how past outcomes inform our predictions about future consequences, especially in an era marked by rising nationalism and shifting power dynamics.

  However, it may be argued that while the overarching purpose of study is threefold as outlined above, it can still be the case that consequences of interaction remain the chief purpose of study, while interaction of key actors and the nature of the system [AC11] is auxiliary. This is not completely implausible, given that the consequences of state interactions, such as war, peace treaties, or economic sanctions, often have immediate and tangible impacts on global stability, security, and human welfare, which policymakers would (reasonably) prioritize over theoretical discussions of state interaction or systemic characteristics. However, I have doubts about making this assertion. The intricate motivations and strategies that drive state behavior, which are essential for a holistic understanding of international relations, can be eclipsed when prioritizing consequences alone.

  ***

  In conclusion, while international anarchy serves as a strong foundational truth for international relations theorists, and understanding its consequences is undeniably important, this focus is but one piece of a larger puzzle. A comprehensive study of international relations must also encompass the mechanisms by which key actors interact as well as the systemic processes and structures underpinning the international realm. The threefold framework can broaden our understanding of the international system compared to the narrower focus of consequences of international anarchy alone − allowing for more nuanced consideration, and subsequently, incisive and informed political decision-making particularly in the realm of foreign affairs.

• Power Politics: How should we assess the power of international actors?

  Power is the ability of an agent to make things go their way, in and through social relations, by getting some other actor to do something they would otherwise not do. On an obvious note, ‘international actors’ refers to states/countries; on a less obvious note, international actors include non-state actors: international/transnational organizations or groups that have substantial influence over international relations. Quick note on the word ‘assess’, which involves the evaluation of the nature or extent of an actor’s power: we not only want to be able tojudge the potential of an international actor to exert power, we want to be able to compare power of international actors (especially since power is relational) − although it’s possible that this comparison might not be transitive, given it can be that each power dynamic is different.

  The concept of power is multifaceted and relational, and our assessment of the power of international actors should accommodate for its nature (hard, soft, or smart power), manifestations (military, economic, diplomatic, cultural), and measurements (resources, tangible actions or events, and outcomes). In this essay I will first (1) define power, then (2) examine how power is exercised, then outline (3) manifestations of power, and (4) methods of assessing power.

  (1) Defining power

  Power is an essentially contested concept (Barnett and Duvall). Some may see power as the capacity to determine their own circumstances and fate; or the ability to get the outcomes one wants. In other words, power is making things go your way, where ‘your way’ refers to some agenda of personal preferences which will (likely) bring about a (perceived) increase in welfare for the agent. 

  But power is relational: making things go your way alone is simply agency. One must also manipulate the actions of some other actor B in some way for it to be considered power. I take Dahl’s behavioral definition of power: ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’. I therefore believe put together in the following way: An agent (A) has power if they can make things go their way [in and through social relations] by getting some other actor (B) to do something they would otherwise not do.

  A bit of elaboration on agency, as it is inextricably linked to power. Agency involves a combination of sound judgement and confident action, for which sound judgement is understood as whatever brings about desired, sustainable, and beneficial outcomes. If A gets its way with, for instance, economic sanctions on another country, but suffers due to its own decision (e.g., sanctions disrupt global trade and damage A’s own economy), then while power was exerted in the immediate sense (A influenced B), A’s long-term position of power might weaken. An example of this is U.S. in the Iraq War in 2003, where the U.S. (A) exerted military power to achieve regime change in Iraq (B) − while it got its way, the long-term outcomes (e.g., regional instability, loss of U.S. credibility) arguably weakened U.S. influence globally. This speaks to the nuances of power and agency.

  (2) How is this power exercised? How does it manifest in international relations?

  In an obvious or intuitive sense, power is exerted through applying force. Forceful behaviors, in this obvious sense, is making things go your way by command. This is known as hard power: the ability to change what others do, which can rest on coercion or inducement (Nye). This can manifest in the use of violent military strength to discourage other countries from posing some threat to them, or apply force to get them to comply with their demands; or the use of economic sanctions, investment incentives or currency manipulation to disrupt other countries’ economic agendas or exert economic pressure. Threat of violence and economic stability can take a critical hit at a state’s wellbeing, so hard power, when imposed effectively, can have an imminent and forceful influence.

  But Nye suggests that this is not the only form of power. We can make things go our way by co-optation, or creating attraction. This is known as soft power: the ability to shape what others want, which can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and values; or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. This can manifest in the exportation of cultural values and norms − for instance, the US’s cultural exports: everyone is familiar with the blockbuster films of Hollywood, Coca-Cola, popular music, all of which have pervasive international influence; China’s Belt and Road initiative as well, having initiated a stretch of across Asia, Africa, and Europe with the intent of improving regional economic integration, strengthening and improving ease of trade, and connecting communities − demonstrating the power of agenda-setting and a leverage of reputational power from taking initiative.

  Hardness and/or softness of power is not necessarily dichotomous, but rather exists on a spectrum. Coercion is the hardest, most explicit form of power; attraction the softest form of power (see table below* to be added). Though it is important to remember hardness and softness is not indicative of its effectiveness: soft power can be just as, if not even more powerful than hard power.

  Note that hard and soft power are not independent of each other: they can work synergistically. They can be used simultaneously (1) by the same actors; (2) by the same actors towards the same target; (3) by the same actors towards the same target for the same goal. 

  The combination of hard power and soft power strategies is known as ‘smart power’ − defined by the Center for Strategic and International Studies as ‘an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand one's influence and establish legitimacy of one's action.’ For instance, the U.S. can combine military hard power with institutional soft power (ex. the UN) to extend international influence.

  In international relations, power manifests in military, economic, diplomatic and cultural dimensions (of which the following presented order coincides with a descendance from hardest to softest power): 

  1. Military power: Maintaining a strong military to deter aggression or project power. 

     1. Deterrence, defense budgets, and interventionism

     2. (e.g. NATO’s role, or China's South China Sea activities)

  2. Economic power: Utilizing economic sanctions, trade agreements, or market influence to sway other states. 

     1. Trade sanctions, foreign aid, and control over global markets 

     2. (e.g. U.S. dollar dominance, EU trade agreements)

  3. Diplomatic power: Skilled negotiation and alliance building to achieve desired outcomes. 

     1. Importance of alliances, treaties, and negotiation 

     2. (e.g. Paris Climate Agreement)

  4. Cultural power: Promoting cultural values and soft diplomacy to gain influence. 

     1. (e.g. Hollywood)

  (4) How is this power measured?

  An actor’s power can be measured by the resources they possess to exert their power in whatever means. As for hard power, the most ‘valid and succinct’ way to measure national power is gross national output (Organski and Kugler − from Chan). Gross national output provides economic resources that can be translated into actions such as controlling key industries, controlling foreign aid and investment, lobbying and political influence, etc. Export/import share as a % of global exports/imports is another useful metric as higher share can give a country control over trade sanctions. Of course this only accounts for economic power: military power can be measured by metrics such as troop numbers or total military expenditure.

  [To be completed]

• Postcolonialism and Empire: “Post-colonial approaches have demonstrated the excessive focus of international relations theorising on Western ideas and experiences”. Discuss.

  I agree with the above statement that postcolonial approaches highlight and demonstrate the excessive focus of international relations theorising on Western ideas. The field of international relations is generally built on the foundation of, and historically inspired by, Western ideas and experiences, with IR theories rising in the historical contexts of and rooted in colonial Europe, which naturally leads to marginalizations of non-Western perspectives. Post-colonial approaches essentially revisit the impacts of European colonialism on non-European or colonized communities, analyse what has brought malignant impact upon the colonized, and attempt to correct them by either bringing awareness to those factors (postcolonial approaches), or unlearning the Western-focused or Eurocentric mindsets that have negatively impacted the colonized (decolonial approaches), whether culturally, normatively, socially, psychologically, etc. While the impacts of colonialism cannot be ‘undone’ or erased necessarily, it can be rectified, and colonized nations can reclaim their identities, experiences, etc. in a way that empowers the colonized without necessarily denying the history and impacts of colonialism, whether positive or negative.

  Understanding the excessive focus of IR theorization on Western ideas and experiences, first and foremost, involves a critical examination of the three foundational theories of IR (realism, liberalism and constructivism). I pose the following questions as challenges to each of the main IR theories, and use some postcolonial approaches to answer these questions, in attempt to understand whether IR foundations are too lenient towards justifying colonialism and giving European perspectives excessive legitimacy:

  (1) Realism: Does the realist notion of anarchy justify colonialism as part of power struggles among states? Does it raise questions about the assumptions of state sovereignty under anarchy, and are all states treated equally?

  (2) Liberalism: Can liberalism’s emphasis on cooperation and mutual gain be reconciled with the exploitation and violence of colonialism?

  (3) Constructivism: Does constructivism’s focus on ‘norms, values, institutions, which keeps people in check’ unintentionally legitimize Western cultural imperialism? − i.e. are colonizers and settlers using this as an excuse/justification upon which to impose their cultures, norms etc. on the colonized?

  (1) Realism and the assumption of state sovereignty under anarchy

  To recall (taken from essay 1): realism is essentially the view that all states are self-centered and act on self-interest (in other words, the assumption of egoism) − imagine the state of nature, but in the international realm. Realism is underpinned by international anarchy, which is the notion that all states are the ultimate sovereign unit of international society − there exists no overarching authority that enforces rules or maintains order among states. Unlike domestic politics, where a sovereign authority exists, the international system lacks such a structure.

  In my first essay I argued that international anarchy is a hard-to-refute foundational tenet of IR due to the Weberian definition of the state as ‘the ability to establish legitimate monopoly over the use of force’, and a (perceived) inability to establish some equivalent legitimate organization on an international scale. I did challenge it by saying there have been international institutions or groups that could potentially replace the functions of the state, but that they are often horizontal agreements, treaties or orders rather than a top-down/vertical relationship between the state and the ruled, so to speak.

  With that understanding it could be valuable to revisit the challenge to anarchy in the context of colonialism. As aforementioned, international anarchy assumes and guarantees sovereignty of states, which is a key assumption required for anarchy to hold true. While it does assume all states are considered as equal units within the system in terms of their sovereignty and lack of a higher authority, it does not necessarily mean that all states are the same in terms of power, capabilities, or other characteristics; the key point is that no state has a superior power to enforce rules over others, making all states essentially equal in their ability to act independently within the system.

  The key here, however, is whether differences ‘in terms of power, capabilities, or other characteristics’ could endogenously affect the condition of state sovereignty, and this is exactly the case of what is happening in the case of colonialism. European states, especially colonial powers such as Britain, Spain, France, Portugal, etc. clearly had significant power and resource advantages, whether technologically (re: Industrial Revolution), intellectually (re: Enlightenment era) or materially (although, it is possible that where they lack(ed) in natural material resources, they compensate for by seeking for it in potential colonies). Nevertheless, power, capability and resource advantages clearly gave these European nations the leverage to colonize, and so, under the assumption of self-interest and opportunism, imperialism happened. International anarchy is not necessarily incongruent with colonialism: it can be said that this is what happens given state sovereignty and unequal power distribution − some players/actors will colonize, the colonized are dissatisfied, and try to regain autonomy − but as we will see, there are some assumptions underpinning anarchy that could be dangerous to ignore.

  Under a non-level playing field, it is easy to establish some top-down relationship between a well-developed, established state, and a territory it decides it wants to conquer. The sovereignty of its colonies is interfered − and it can be called into question whether it existed at all. Were non-European states (Africa being the best example of this) even states to begin with, or are states and boundaries in Africa as we know it today merely inventions of European colonization, and/or administrative tools (re: Scott in Seeing Like a State) to make sense of a vastly undefined natural territory (at least in the eyes of the Europeans)? In other words, international anarchy rests on the assumption of state sovereignty − which rests on the assumption that all the world is organized in states as theorized by European thinkers − which is simply untrue, or untrue until the Europeans made it so by establishing states in areas that weren’t organized in these ways.

  An interesting question arises at this point of the discussion: is Europe inherently superior to their colonies in terms of power and resources, or did they simply get there first? The postcolonial approach of ‘border thinking’, essentially thinking from the ‘underside’ of modernity, to think with the perspectives of people who are marginalized, undervalued, or excluded by the ideals of modernity (e.g. non-white and/or indigenous peoples, women, etc.) may serve as a subversive approach to answering the above question. This kind of thinking is subversive because it ‘rejects the authority of European ‘reason’ and introduces the possibility of alternatives to colonial modernity’ (Sabaratham). For instance, China had invented gunpowder, paper, printing, advanced bureaucracy, and a massive economy centuries before Europe caught up; the Islamic world had algebra, medicine, astronomy, and large trade networks that connected Asia, Africa, and Europe, and the Aztec, Inca, and Maya had complex societies with architecture, engineering, and governance before European contact. While not all the examples are former colonies, these hopefully help to demonstrate that the Europeans didn’t introduce progress − they arrived in a world already full of progress, but simply used colonialism to tip the scales in their favor.

  Now that we are in a postcolonial international society, is it any different? Neocolonialism, another postcolonial approach, says it is outwardly so on paper, but not the case in practice. The essence of neocolonialism is that ‘the [decolonized] State [..] is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside’ (Sabaratham). For instance, many former French colonies in Africa (e.g. Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali) are politically independent but still heavily influenced by France through economic and military ties. The CFA franc, a currency used by 14 African nations, is controlled by the French Treasury, meaning these countries lack full monetary sovereignty; and France has also intervened militarily in African states multiple times, reinforcing political dependence. Even after colonialism’s end, we cannot fully assume total sovereignty of non-European states despite independence on paper.

  (2) Liberalism and the assumption of mutual gain

  Liberalism is essentially the challenge to the realist egoism assumption, or rather a proof of the possibility of mutual gain through cooperation − imagine the social contract theory wherein actors are states (from essay 1, again). Whether liberalism is an accurate representation of IR, or whether it succeeds to sustain in practice was challenged on the following grounds: (a) the spread of nationalism and emphasis on self-determination overrode the spread of liberal democracy; (b) as the spread of liberal democracy originates from the West, some targeted states may resist foreign efforts out of self-protection (Mearsheimer). That said, the idea of mutual gain through cooperation remains a valuable approach in understanding how global order can be maintained, especially considering the chaos that could ensue in absence of it.

  The assumption of mutual gain, however, is constantly and easily challenged in colonial and postcolonial contexts. Rodney argues that 'colonialism did not benefit Africa’s development': benefits from colonialism were small and that they were not gifts from the colonialists, but rather fruits of African labor and resources for the most part. He goes so far to say that ‘the development of Africa’ by the colonialists was a cynical shorthand expression for ‘the intensification of colonial exploitation in Africa to develop capitalist Europe’. While it is undeniable that European innovations in Africa such as modern medicine, clinical surgery, and immunization were objectively positive features, however limited they were quantitatively, Rodney crucially writes that the exploitation and the comparative disadvantage are the ingredients of underdevelopment, creating a greater gap between Africa and capitalist Europe. The setback of underdevelopment immeasurably outweighs the insignificant external markers of perceived African developmental gain through European colonization. Indeed, in most cases post-independence economic decline in Africa can be explicitly attributed to colonialism because the types of mechanisms that led to this decline were creations of colonial society.

  It seems the challenges to liberalism even when abstracting from colonialism still stand: egoism and self-interest overtook the colonial powers (point a), and rather than a mutual gain, an imbalance of gain was the obtained outcome, especially when the colonized were not quite yet prepared to fight back. As Rodney writes, ‘European science met the needs of its own society, and particularly those of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie did not suffer from hunger and starvation. Bourgeois science therefore did not consider those things as needs which had to be met and overcome − not even among their own workers and least of all on behalf of Africans’. When the colonized are prepared to fight back, they will resist and gain independence (point b) − by then, a mutual-gain relationship is unlikely to be sustained.

  (3) Constructivism and the Eurocentric shaping of norms

  Constructivism, somewhat of a blend between realism and liberalism, essentially holds that international relations are socially constructed, not given. It suggests that the interests and identities of actors are shaped by subjective ideas rather than just material factors. Countries live in a social construct of an ‘international society’, but an international one where states are the ‘people’. This society is in absence of a central government, but has basically everything else that a society has: norms, values, institutions, which keeps people in check.

  But what make up these norms and values? The constructivist norms underpinning IR are inherently Eurocentric, prioritizing liberal democracy, nation-state sovereignty, and free-market capitalism as universal models; yet these frameworks were historically imposed through colonial domination, often disregarding indigenous governance, communal economies, and non-Western legal traditions. Edward Said’s Orientalism explains how the West constructs non-Western societies as the ‘Other’, portraying them as backward and in need of modernization. Similarly, Aníbal Quijano’s modernity/coloniality framework highlights how modernity was built on colonial hierarchies, positioning European ideas as inherently superior while marginalizing indigenous knowledge systems and alternative forms of governance (Sabaratham).

  Beyond material conquest, colonization operates through ideological and psychological subjugation, shaping the identities and agency of the colonized. Frantz Fanon argues that colonialism is a ‘total’ system that not only controls land and resources, but warps self-perception, rendering colonized peoples inferior in their own eyes. Likewise, Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony explains how power is maintained not just through force, but through cultural dominance − where colonized subjects internalize colonial values as the norm. These processes ensure that even after decolonization, former colonies remain intellectually and economically dependent on Western frameworks, reinforcing neocolonial structures.

  Decolonial approaches are thus crucial in dismantling Eurocentric constructivism. Decolonization is not merely the retrieval of political independence but also the reclamation of indigenous agency, language, and spirituality − what Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o calls ‘decolonizing the mind’. Overcoming the colonial legacy requires dismantling Eurocentric epistemologies and restoring suppressed knowledge systems: this means challenging the assumption that liberal democracy and Western capitalism are the only viable models for governance and development. For instance, Confucian meritocracy in East Asian countries, namely China, Korea and Vietnam, requires leaders to be wise and virtuous, not just elected based on popularity as with democratic values. Another example is Sharia Law in Islamic countries, where religion, ethics and governance are integrated into one another, as opposed to Western secular legal codes. Decolonial approaches seek to create a more pluralistic international society — one that acknowledges multiple ways of being, governing, and knowing, rather than enforcing a singular, Eurocentric path to modernity.

  Here though it’s notable how constructivism is actually the most accommodating towards non-Western ideas, and is actually how we can move towards decolonization and a shift away from Eurocentrism. Constructivists think that identities and interests are socially constructed and changeable. They believe that reality is not fixed, but rather subject to change; they believe that human behavior is determined by their identity, which is shaped by society's values, history, practices, and institutions. Constructivism is malleable, and the constructivist approach, if we choose to honor non-Western voices and values, can actually accommodate really well for a shift away from Eurocentrism.

  That said though, colonialism has made Eurocentric values the norm. The impacts of colonialism cannot be reversed - i.e. much of the world has been Westernized; that is the truth and reality of the condition, and there is not much that can be done about it; so despite post-colonialism highlighting the excessive focus on Western ideas, there is some truth to the world being skewed towards a Western system, and IR cannot be blamed for capturing the world through such a lens. But postcolonial approaches are a revisitation of the condition of the world after the impacts of colonialism, and when coupled with decolonization, can amplify once-marginalized voices to unskew Western social constructs created by colonialism.

  Conclusion

  To conclude, postcolonial approaches challenge the realist assumption of international anarchy by highlighting how the assumption of state sovereignty under realist anarchy is frail when faced with a highly uneven playing field between the colonial powers and the colonized; how any seeming mutual-gain relationship between the two is fallacious, and ultimately unsustainable; and finally, how constructivist norms in international society have been Eurocentric thus far, especially with the spread of Western liberal democratic ideals overpowering alternative ways of thinking. I never claim IR theory to be incompatible with postcolonial or decolonial approaches, as it can be the case that such theories in fact explain imperialism and decolonization as a natural evolution under unequal anarchy; but IR theory does pose assumptions that dangerously marginalize non-Western approaches, and gives some legitimizing ground to colonialism that, realistically, probably should not be given so forgivingly. The real question is whether IR can truly be reformed to accommodate non-Western perspectives, or whether a decolonial approach necessitates moving beyond IR as it currently exists. I find, though, that the foundations of IR are sufficiently accommodating; though looking towards constructivism could potentially be a promising approach to amplifying non-Western ways of thinking as its malleability as a dynamic ‘social-construct’ view allows worldviews to be evolved however we see fit.

• International Cooperation: What role do international institutions play in promoting cooperation?

  The fundamental challenge in international relations is that under anarchy, cooperation among states is difficult to achieve. In a world where states are sovereign, their primary goal is the preservation of their own security and the maximization of power. However, international institutions (IOs) play a significant role in facilitating cooperation by reducing uncertainty, lowering transaction costs, and promoting shared norms. These institutions vary from formal intergovernmental organizations (such as the UN, WTO, and NATO) to informal rules and norms that guide state behavior (Mearsheimer). While realists often dismiss IOs as ineffective or as tools of great powers, institutionalists argue that IOs enhance cooperation by providing information, ensuring reciprocity, and stabilizing expectations (Keohane & Martin).

  In this essay, I evaluate the accuracy of different and often competing answers to the question: What role do international institutions (IOs) play in promoting cooperation?

  (1)   The realist answer (Mearsheimer): IOs do little (if anything) in promoting cooperation, as cooperation is not possible under anarchy; IOs provide little (if not false) promise.

  (2)   The institutionalist answer (Ibid) (Keohane and Martin):

  (a)   The liberal institutionalist answer: IOs’ purpose is the prevention of cheating.

  (b)   The collective-security institutionalist answer: IOs’ purpose is pushing states away from war and promoting peace.

  (c)   The critical-theory institutionalist answer: IOs’ purpose is promoting norms of trust and sharing, transforming international system into a world society and creating genuine peace system.

  (3)   The causal answer (Barnett and Finnemore): IOs are created to solve problems of incomplete information, transaction costs, and other barriers to Pareto efficiency and welfare improvement for their members.

  (4)   The consequential answer (Ibid): How IOs actually behave after they are created reveal that many IOs stray from the efficiency goals these theories impute and that many IOs exercise power autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated by states at their creation. It’s therefore important to consider IOs’ actual behavior in evaluating their role.

  I ultimately find that the real role of IOs lies somewhere between the four, and is of a dual nature: IOs are well-intended, aiming to prevent cheating under anarchy, promote norms and ensure collective security, and are established for that reason; yet IOs in actuality can operate in ways that perpetuate power imbalances under anarchy (often serving hegemonic powers in an almost international ‘oligarchy’ of states), and in following of its own bureaucratic agendas IOs can lose sight of their intentions of solving cooperation.

  ***

  The realist answer

  Realists, particularly John Mearsheimer, argue that IOs have a minimal role in fostering cooperation because states operate in an anarchic system where survival and power concerns dictate behavior. Mearsheimer’s five core assumptions underpin this view:

  1. Anarchy prevails; there is no higher authority enforcing rules.

  2. States possess military capabilities, making them inherently dangerous to one another.

  3. States cannot be certain of others’ intentions, leading to distrust.

  4. Survival is the primary goal. States prioritize sovereignty above cooperation.

  5. States are rational actors, strategically pursuing their interests.

  According to Mearsheimer, cooperation is inhibited by relative-gains considerations and the fear of cheating. When states contemplate cooperation, they not only assess their absolute gains (how much they individually benefit) but also their relative gains (how much better or worse off they are compared to others). Realists argue that states are primarily motivated by relative gains, as they are concerned about losing power or security relative to other states. Under these conditions, realists predict that states will prioritize self-preservation, fear each other, and avoid cooperation unless it serves their interests without compromising security. Mearsheimer criticizes liberal institutionalism, arguing that it applies only to economic cooperation and not to issues of security.

  That said, Mearsheimer’s realism has obviously been met with refutation: Keohane and Martin argue that realism’s broad generalizations contain contradictions. For instance, Mearsheimer acknowledges that NATO helped prevent World War III, which seems to contradict his assertion that IOs cannot fundamentally alter state behavior. Additionally, the assumption that states will always prioritize relative gains is overly simplistic. Institutions, as Keohane and Martin point out, help reduce uncertainty, stabilize expectations, and facilitate long-term cooperation, which can mitigate the focus on relative gains. Institutions, they argue, do not eliminate conflict but make sustained cooperation possible in an anarchic world.

  The institutionalist answer

  Institutionalists, such as Keohane in After Hegemony, argue that institutions are critical for enabling cooperation even in an anarchic system. Institutions (1) reduce uncertainty by providing information and transparency about states' actions; (2) lower transaction costs by facilitating regular interactions, diplomacy, and dispute resolution, making cooperation between states with conflicting interests easier and less risky; and (3) ensure reciprocity by establishing rules that ensure states can punish defectors and build long-term trust (ex. WTO trade enforcement mechanisms).

  Although institutions do not eliminate conflict, they make sustained cooperation under anarchy possible by reducing uncertainty, ensuring reciprocity, and managing distributional issues. While institutions are not a panacea, they are necessary for long-term peace in a world without centralized authority. Mearsheimer lays out three types of institutionalism − liberal institutionalism, collective security and critical theory − each for which he challenges the causal logic of but are still valuable perspectives nevertheless:

  (1) The liberal-institutionalist answer: Liberal institutionalists emphasize the role of IOs in promoting economic cooperation, particularly in preventing cheating and encouraging trust through repeated interactions. For example, the European Union’s trade policies have been successful in promoting cooperation by creating incentives for member states to honor agreements. However, the liberal institutionalist framework has been criticized for oversimplifying the complex dynamics of international relations. It fails to account for the role of power, distributional issues, and non-economic factors that influence state behavior.

  (2) The collective-security institutionalist answer: Collective security theorists, such as those advocating for the role of the United Nations (UN), argue that institutions can also prevent conflict by promoting norms against war. By fostering a collective commitment to peace and security, institutions like the UN and peacekeeping missions play a key role in preventing state conflicts and ensuring global stability. This theory emphasizes the importance of international cooperation to maintain peace, particularly in post-conflict situations.

  (3) The critical-theory institutionalist answer: Critical theorists, the most ambitious of institutionalist thinkers, challenge the traditional notion of state behavior and advocate for the transformation of international relations into a more peaceful, cooperative world society. These theorists argue that IOs should not only regulate cooperation but also promote norms of trust and solidarity that transform the international system. They envision a world where genuine peace is created through the establishment of global norms, trust, and shared values, pushing states away from war and fostering a more harmonious international community.

  The causal and consequential answer

  Barnett and Finnemore argue that IOs are created to solve problems of incomplete information, transaction costs, and other barriers to efficiency and welfare improvement. However, IOs often stray from their original efficiency goals. In practice, many IOs operate with their own agendas and can behave autonomously, sometimes in ways that reflect the interests of powerful states rather than the collective goals of their members. I term the ‘cause’ of IO-creation as the ‘causal answer’ and the ‘consequences’ of IO-creation the ‘consequential answer’, creating a distinction between what IOs intend to do while holding space for their inability to follow through with the actual effects of their actions and pursuit of their goals − highlighting the fact that while IOs may be created with the intention of promoting cooperation, they may also reinforce existing power imbalances and global inequalities.

  Reconciliation: dual-nature of international institutions

  IOs are designed to facilitate cooperation under anarchy, yet in practice, they often reinforce existing power structures and serve the interests of dominant states. The role of international institutions is inherently dual-natured, for which can be reconciled by acknowledging both their intended function (institutionalist + causal) and their practical (realist + consequential) behavior.

  Institutional + causal account: institutions as designed solutions to anarchy

  Institutionalists like Keohane and Martin argue that IOs emerge as a response to the challenges posed by anarchy. Without a central authority to enforce agreements, cooperation among states is fraught with uncertainty, incentives to defect, and difficulties in coordinating long-term strategies. IOs address these issues by:

  (1)   solving the Prisoner’s Dilemma; essentially, creating a framework that ensures repeated interactions thus increasing the costs of defection and incentivizing cooperation (liberal institutionalist view).

  (2)   establishing rules and norms through codifying agreements, regulating state behavior, and provide enforcement mechanisms (critical-theory institutionalist view).

  (3)   attempting to institutionalize security cooperation, ensuring that states have shared mechanisms to address common threats (collective-security institutionalist view).

  Beyond these roles, IOs develop bureaucracies with near-sovereign authority (Barnett and Finnemore). These bureaucracies often gain autonomy from the states that create them, operating under self-sustaining rules and procedures. IOs, therefore, evolve beyond mere tools of statecraft and become independent actors with their own mandates, shaping international norms and expectations in ways that states do not always anticipate or control.

  Realist + consequential account: institutions as tools of power and hegemony

  While institutionalist theory focuses on how IOs are meant to work, realists and critical theorists highlight how they actually behave. Realists like Mearsheimer argue that IOs do not fundamentally alter the logic of anarchy but instead reflect the interests of the most powerful states. In this view, IOs reinforce existing power structures, rather than acting as neutral facilitators of cooperation. The IMF and World Bank, for example, often impose structural adjustment programs that reflect Western economic preferences, disproportionately benefiting wealthier states while constraining the autonomy of weaker ones. Institutional mechanisms can be used selectively by powerful states to legitimize their actions, such as the UN Security Council serving as a forum where great powers authorize military interventions while often disregarding violations by their own allies. IO bureaucracies, rather than being neutral, can take on hegemonic characteristics, normalizing the interests of dominant states and imposing standards that reflect the values of the most influential actors in the system.

  Barnett and Finnemore’s pathologies of IOs reinforce this realist-consequentialist argument. IOs, once created, can become detached from their original efficiency goals and develop bureaucratic inertia, acting in ways unintended by their founders. This includes irrational decision-making, excessive proceduralism, and the reinforcement of global inequalities.

  IOs under anarchy: between idealism and realpolitik

  This reconciliation also brings us back to the core debate about anarchy. From a strict realist perspective (Mearsheimer), anarchy dictates that states will always act in self-interest, and IOs merely reflect the preferences of the most powerful actors. Cooperation is only possible when it aligns with power interests, and institutions do not fundamentally alter state behavior. On the other hand, pro-institutionalists (such as Keohane & Martin) argue that while anarchy creates obstacles to cooperation, institutions help overcome these challenges by reducing uncertainty, stabilizing expectations, and enabling states to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation. Barnett & Finnemore, who view IOs as bureaucracies, provide a more nuanced view, showing that while IOs are created to facilitate cooperation, they take on a life of their own, sometimes reinforcing the very power imbalances and strategic calculations that realists emphasize.

  ***

  Ultimately, international institutions exist in a paradox: they are designed to facilitate cooperation under anarchy, yet their very structure and evolution often reflect and reinforce the power politics that realists describe. While institutionalists are correct in identifying the functional need for IOs, realists are also right in noting that these institutions do not operate in a vacuum; they are shaped by the same power struggles that define international relations. Understanding the actual role of IOs, therefore, requires a holistic understanding of both their (predominately positive) intended roles and their (mixed, though predominately inefficacious) real-world consequences, and accommodating for both for a redirection of IOs towards rendering their actual roles more aligned with their intended roles.

• Global War and Security: Is the post-Cold War world a more secure world or just a world with new insecurities?

  Following the Cold War (1947-1991), a period marked by global geopolitical rivalry (absent direct fighting, albeit replete with proxy wars) between the US (and its allies − the capitalist Western Bloc) and USSR (and its allies − the communist Eastern Bloc), the bipolar world order between the two global superpowers was replaced with a unipolar one, with the collapse of the Soviet Union after 1991 and with the US emerging victorious as the world’s sole superpower. With the Cold War period as the last significant period distinctly marked by global insecurity and proxy warfare affecting both the bipolar superpowers and their allies (and subsequently the security of all living under the international system), there is good reason to believe the post-Cold War world, i.e. the world after 1991, is a more secure world than the world before it, and I don’t necessarily refute this claim but I believe further specification and examination is needed to verify it. I argue that the post-Cold War world is simultaneously a more secure world and a world with new insecurities. I do this by defining hierarchy of security in such a way that puts war and violence at the forefront of security (as it poses existential threat), and so the decline in violence is an increase in world security. I pose challenges to the decline of existential security, but ultimately argue that those challenges − while to some extent valid − do not disprove our thesis. That said, new insecurities have risen that haven’t previously been present: existential security remains a threat in old and new forms; and it’s not immediately apparent that nonviolent dimensions of security (e.g. economic, social and institutional) have become more secure over time.

  ***

  First, defining the concept of security is crucial to the essay. According to UN, ‘any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international security’. This is a solid principle underpinning security, but security is a complex concept − one that Baldwin posits can be both neglected and contested: neglected in the sense that attempts to redefine security leave conceptual analysis underdeveloped, and contested in the sense that scholars can hardly come to a consensus on what the concept is in actuality. According to Baldwin, security is a contextual concept that needs to be specified, with two key specifications required to define the concept: (1) security for whom, and (2) security for which values (although further requirement of specification needed to guide pursuit).

  1. Actors/stakeholders for which security concerns in IR generally include (but are not exclusively limited to) states, individuals, the international system, the environment, etc.

  2. Values for which security concerns in IR include (but are not limited to) physical safety, economic welfare, political independence, etc.

  Taking these concepts of security, I make a key distinction between traditional narrower views of security as freedom from violence, vs. a multifaceted view of security as a contextual, specified concept. While security as freedom from violence is the most crucial element of security, as it concerns (large-scale) threat of survival, it is also the most traditional view of security and can often be too narrow a view, neglecting other aspects of security that do not concern immediate violence, for instance other existential threats (natural resources, environment), economic security, or even those concerning identity and norms. 

  Given the nature of the question we should also decide how to compare security (and decide whether security is even comparable in the first place). I think security can be compared by constructing some hierarchy of security, from most to least urgent, as follows:

  1. Existential / survival-level security: As aforementioned this involves physical security/security from violence: without protection from direct threats like war, terrorism, or crime, all other securities become meaningless. But this also include physiological security (food, water and health) and energy security (energy is essential for modern life). On a state-level this means national security: a state must exist and be sovereign to provide any form of security to its people.

  2. Stability and economic well-being: This involves economic stability, as well as other forms of stability relevant and essential to the modern world such as cybersecurity and environmental security. 

  3. Social and identity-based security: This involves the protection of cultural, religious or ethnic identities, as well as the prevention of radicalization, ethnic conflicts and migration-related tensions for social cohesion. This is significant but ranks lower than economic or physical threats. 

  4. Institutional and normative security: This involves political stability, rule of law, and human rights security. These ensure good governance and human dignity/freedoms but are less immediate than the aforementioned threats.

  ***

  With a good framework for comparing security in mind we can then observe global trends in security over time, starting with examining the evolution of large-scale violence (a tier-one concern). There is an undeniable visible decline in violence since the Cold War, and in fact, as Steven Pinker claims in ‘Better Angels’, there has been an extraordinary but little-recognized, millenia-long worldwide reduction in all forms of violence — one that stretches back at least to 10,000 BCE (Human Security Report (HSR)). 

  While Pinker’s claim is quite ambitious and rather contestable, there is certainly good reason behind his claim. The HSR outlines five key trends leading to dramatic reduction in death-rates: (1) the Pacification Process spanning thousands of years, wherein transitions from anarchy/early human society to agricultural civilization to nation-states have dramatically reduced death rates; (2) the Civilizing Process from late-middle ages to the 20th-century, involving the growth and consolidation of the nation-state system in Europe, wherein the transition to a urban, cosmopolitan, commercial, secular modern state highly represses fatal violence; (3) the Humanitarian Revolution from the 17th to 18th century involving a long-term reduction and abolition in all manners of cruel and inhumane practices, particularly slavery and judicial torture; (4) the Long Peace, wherein the end of WWII brought disappearances of great-power wars, and dramatic reduction in number and deadliness of other international conflicts; (5) finally, the New Peace of the post-Cold War period (the period in question): the number of conflicts within states declined substantially after increasing for some four decades, and a new form of global security governance emerged.

  Convincing as the proposed timeline is, two main challenges to Pinker’s thesis are posed − firstly, how to reconcile the existence of WWII, the ‘deadliest war in human history’, in the modern age; and secondly, the lack of evidence for violence among anarchic hunter-gatherer and other non-state groups that made up the earliest human societies, as Pinker goes back 10000+ years in his claim. To be clear, these challenges do not threaten post-Cold War security claims, and only threatens Pinker’s central claim that the 20th-century onwards is the most secure era in human history. But they do require us to consider the scope of comparison: is the post-Cold War period ‘more secure’ compared to which version of the world? Cold War? Pre-Cold War? How far back should we look? It is relatively safe to say our argument for post-Cold War decline in violent holds regardless of comparison − simply declaring post-Cold War decline in war and violence is quite uncontroversial, but temporal scope might be a problem should we decide to look further ahead and predict future patterns, considering how short a time the post-Cold War era has lasted (merely three and a half decades). 

  More concrete challenges to our thesis might question whether this perceived decline in violent conflict is enough to sustain existential security. It is firstly worthwhile to mention that this perceived decline is still quite Eurocentric; it is not entirely evident that proxy wars and (often post-colonial, civil) wars fought in Middle-Eastern or African states have declined. Tensions lessened by the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of the mass media and its impact on public perception, growing competition for dwindling natural resources, but also the general war-weariness, has resulted in widespread proliferation of so-called ‘proxies’, especially in the form of non-state actors. That said, given we are comparing this era to much more violent eras, our hypothesis is likely still true. 

  Another factor we shouldn’t neglect, (that might counterbalance the Eurocentrism of the claim,) is the rise in other forms of violence in developed states − homicides (ex. terrorism, transnational organized crime, interstate or internal conflict including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities) (UN). While declinist literature focuses primarily on war, homicides receive comparatively little attention, despite evidence that drug-related organized violence has, at times, surpassed battle deaths in conflicts like Afghanistan, Sudan, or Iraq. In Central America, for example, civil wars largely ended by the 1990s, yet organized crime replaced traditional warfare as the primary source of lethal violence. However, homicide data from developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, have historically been unreliable or absent, making it difficult to determine long-term global trends. Some argue that homicides may have increased even as war deaths declined, but rising state capacity and economic development tend to correlate with lower homicide rates. As national incomes grow, states gain more resources to deter, prevent, and manage violent crime, suggesting that global homicide rates may follow a downward trajectory in line with broader security improvements.

  Additionally, the rise in technology in warfare, from nuclear and possibly the use of AI pose warfare issues unique to the 21st century. Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons render potential future warfare highly dangerous. Finally, the issue of climate change, though non-violent, poses a unique but potentially highly dangerous existential threat to future generations. Long-term survival depends on a stable environment, but it is not always an immediate existential threat. Its effects are not immediate − we are beginning to see some effect of it (in natural disasters) − but it’s not quite enough to threaten current security.

  ***

  Having looked at the decline in essential (tier-one) violence and its proof, we can move onto the evolution of security tiers two to four. I identify rises of new insecurities in these tiers of security, often brought about as a side effect of globalization.

  Firstly, nonviolent economic and physiological (tier-two) threats remain an issue: poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation persist regardless of a country’s economic development (UN). While global healthcare, technology, and social infrastructures are rapidly improving, disparities in development mean that underprivileged populations remain vulnerable. Many individuals are still unable to meet basic needs, and states — driven by political priorities—often sideline these issues in favor of more immediate concerns.

  Secondly, globalization, despite its benefits, has also been a driver of insecurity by enabling cybercrime, transnational organized crime, money laundering, human trafficking, terrorism financing, and the proliferation of small arms. Additionally, globalization has fueled ideological and identity-based (tier-three) insecurities, leading to the rise of populism and intensifying clashes between native populations and ethnic minorities. At its worst, this exacerbates ingroup-outgroup tensions, which can escalate into violent nationalist or sectarian conflicts.

  Thirdly, institutional and normative insecurities (tier-four) remain contested. Democratic peace theory (DPT) and the global promotion of democratic values are often framed as progress toward greater institutional security. Yet this perspective is deeply Eurocentric, assuming that democratization naturally leads to peace while overlooking the political conflicts and historical grievances that continue to shape global instability. Many unresolved tensions dating back to the 20th century persist, particularly in regions where religious extremism, private interests, corruption, and dwindling natural resources fuel conflicts. Furthermore, while international organizations such as the UN were established to promote collective security, their legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny: the 2004 UN report critiqued the UN Security Council for its lack of representation and urgent need for reform. All in all, tier-four security remains insecure in a world still shaped by power imbalances and competing interests.

  ***

  In conclusion, the post-Cold War world is paradoxically both more secure and more insecure. The decline in large-scale, life-threatening violence remains the most defining indicator of global security, and in that sense, the world is safer than before. However, this should not overshadow the reality of emerging insecurities in lower tiers. Security is not static, but rather evolves across temporal scales. The fact that existential insecurity (in terms of large-scale violent conflict) has decreased does not negate the growing concerns of economic, social, and institutional insecurity.

  An intriguing case is climate security, which does not pose an immediate existential threat but carries significant implications for future generations. Similarly, while there are developments toward institutional and normative (tier-four) security, they are neither universal nor uncontested. The Eurocentrism of DPT, the persistence of proxy wars driven by ideological and religious divides, and the reemergence of global bipolarity with China’s rise as a superpower all challenge the assumption of a stable, secure world order. Whether these trends lead to greater security or deeper fragmentation remains an open question.

• Identity and International Security: Does the Israel-Palestine dispute indicate that nationalism is a source of order or disorder in international society?

  The Israel-Palestine dispute, having taken recent global precedence as a humanitarian crisis particularly in the 2023 Gaza war, has been an ongoing military political conflict since 1948 following Jewish occupation of the former Mandatory Palestine (some may argue the dispute extends beyond 1948, but insofar as it concerns nationalism and self-determination we may assume this temporal limit for now.) This dispute is centered around land and self-determination − a centrally nationalist conflict at its core − for both Israel and Palestine. What this means is both Israelis and Palestinians want to be able to establish an autonomous, sovereign nation-state in the same territory. That is, evidently, a difficult conflict to resolve, and one that is highly prone to attempts at resolution through violent means.

  Nationalism is the desire for a congruent nation-state, or in other words, the rulers and ruled community living within some given borders/specific territory should belong to the same nation (i.e. connected by culture, history or another commonality). The rise of nationalism, following waves of revolution and independence movements, came about in the late 18th-19th centuries, and brought about a framework of rule − almost like a way of being in the modern system. The Israel-Palestine dispute essentially is fought between two camps of nationalists: Zionists (Israeli nationalists who aim to create and establish a Jewish national state) and Palestinian nationalists. There is also a distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, with the former more inclusionary and the latter more exclusionary: I argue that the Israel-Palestine conflict is ethnic in nature, but some proposed solutions point to civic-nationalist roads of reconciliation.

  While nationalism can theoretically bring about order in that self-determining nation- states will be able to exercise full autonomy, promoting stability, the nature of Israeli-Palestinian nationalism (and by the fact that the conflict remains unresolved to this day) demonstrates nationalism at its most aggressive, oppressive and exclusionary, due to competing, exclusionary claims and historical (and ethnic) grievances. While civic nationalism could potentially provide a path to orderly reconciliation, I argue that elements of mutual distrust from a historical buildup of violent events decrease its feasibility in the Israel-Palestine case. 

  ***

  First, the dispute between Israel and Palestine was not always nationalist in nature. Pre-nationalist Israel-Palestine was a period characterized by relative coexistence before ethnic nationalism. Before the establishment of Mandatory Palestine in the 1920s, the land had been previously part of the Ottoman Empire (1516-1917) with a majority Arab population (Muslim and Christian) and a small Jewish community. Here, Jews, Muslims, and Christians lived in relative peace under imperial rule. While it was not completely free of tensions, Imperial governance (millet system) allowed for (relatively peaceful) multiethnic coexistence. Even further back, the region was historically known as Canaan (later Israel) but was inhabited by various peoples including ancient Israelites, Philistines etc. However, the rise of nationalism in the late 19th century (Zionism and Arab nationalism) changed the conflict from local disputes to an existential struggle for national self-determination: this period of relative coexistence, putting modern Israeli-Palestinian conflict dynamics into perspective, demonstrates how the Israel-Palestine dispute is not an inevitable consequence of cultural/religious differences, but a product of modern nationalist ideology.

  Unlike the pre-nationalist period, modern nationalism has fueled an ongoing cycle of violence instead of resolving disputes (Beinart). Before 1948, the now-Jewish state was once Mandatory Palestine, established in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the Mandate for Palestine was granted by the League of Nations to Britain in 1922, which intended to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine, but also recognized the rights of Palestinian Arabs. Zionist immigration was met with Arab opposition, mediated by an Israeli- leaning Britain, soon replaced by the US. Since the establishment of the Israeli state, Palestinians have had to seek refuge in neighbouring territories (re: Nakba), all while the US has been compliant in approbating and legitimizing Israeli expansion of control with the conquest of Palestinian territory as well as neighbouring states (ex. Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War, or 1982 invasion of Lebanon), deepening nationalist grievances. 

  Palestinian retaliation came in the form of two Intifadas (uprisings by Palestinians against Israel and its occupation) − these respectively ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of 2005, though neither resolved any fundamental Palestinian demands (national sovereignty, an end to occupation and colonization, the right of return for refugees, an agreement on Jerusalem, delineated borders, and land and water rights), and only worsened mutual distrust and violence over time in actuality, making reconciliation difficult. Violent activity continued into the 21st century, including the recent war on Gaza beginning 2023 (deadliest for Palestinians yet).

  ***

  Defining nationalism is contingent on defining nation and state: a nation is a large group of people inhabiting a specific territory connected by culture, history, or another commonality (such as ethnic identity), whereas a state is a ‘human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weberian definition). Congruence of the two means not only that the majority of the state’s population identifies with the national culture, but also that the rulers of a nation should belong to the same nation as the majority of the ruled. Violation of the congruence property is a ‘quite outstandingly intolerable [breach] of political propriety’ (Gellner), as it undermines the state’s legitimacy since it is seen as foreign or oppressive, deepening distrust and eroding identity and self-determination, hence making governance unstable. This is the essence of the Israel-Palestine dispute: the US approved the Establishment of the State of Israel on 56% of Arab majority land, such that a minority of Jews rule over a majority of Palestinian Arabs; and this remains the case today. 

  International order is the relative stability of the international system, characterized by the absence of unchecked chaos and large-scale war. If something is a source of international order it is, essentially, the patterns − rules, norms, institutions − by which states behave in an international system. In the case of nationalism, the principle that the nation should be congruent with the state is the predominant ‘rule’ or ‘norm’ in international society, a way of being for states. Whether it is a source of order or disorder depends on whether it brings about (relative) stability; whether it is able to safeguard state sovereignty; promote cooperation; etc. With that, nationalism brings order when it achieves nation-state congruence; it brings disorder when it remains contested, exclusionary, or leads to prolonged conflict.

  The relationship between nationalism and international order is nuanced, as different forms of nationalism have different impacts on international order. Civic nationalism is rights-based and inclusive: it shapes national definitions around its citizens, and holds the belief that ‘everyone who adheres to and values the institutions and civic value of the nation belongs to the nation, regardless of their ethnic origins’. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is identity-based and exclusive: it cares not about values and institutions, but instead only about ethnicity/descent, which can fuel violence and be potentially dangerous down the line. Ethnic nationalism fuels disorder, as Arabs and Jews resent each other for occupying their (respective perceived) homeland. Civic nationalism, then, theoretically provides order, but struggles in practice due to mutual distrust.

  ***

  The two-state solution (also known as the Partition Plan; self-explanatory from the name) refers to partitioning the current State of Israel into two separate, de facto sovereign Israeli and Palestinian states. The State of Palestine is currently recognized as a sovereign state by 145 of 193 UN member-states; yet, until Palestine can act independently of Israel’s rule, it cannot be considered a state de facto, and legally it is still not considered one (largely due to US veto). The two-state solution aligns with the view of nationalism as a source of order and stability, as each side gets its own state, resolving nationalist claims. 

  Miller argues that the two-state solution is more practical than a one-state solution due to mutual distrust and long-standing grievances. Miller proposes eight necessary conditions for a partition, all of which the dispute, Miller argues, fulfills: (1) the conflict is nationalist; (2) the key aspiration of both Palestinians and Israelis is national independence; (3) two-states for two nations is most effective in minimizing state-to-nation imbalances; (4) a history of protracted violence creates mutual distrust; (5) mutual distrust, for its part, increases the need for a partition; (6) partition is feasible in this case; (7) there is considerable public support for the partition (especially among the Jews, though also somewhat along the Palestinians); and (8) there is a realistic possibility for reciprocal exchange. 

  Conditions (5) and (6) are particularly worth mentioning. Firstly, a bi-national state built on the foundation of mutual distrust seems bounded for failure − as Miller writes, ‘in the Israeli-Palestinian case the parties always needed third-party mediation for addressing their disputes, so how could they cooperate in jointly managing a bi-national state? … it is quite reasonable to expect that power-sharing will lead to more violence and bloodshed, especially [also since] demographic changes (such as increased birth rate of Arabs) will challenge power-sharing arrangements’. Secondly, partition is, at least according to Miller, potentially feasible − with the 1967 borders providing some clear basis for division, upon which small land swaps can be coordinated to reduce disruption rendering partition more practical, and the responsibility falls on Israel to compensate and relocate its settlers. The Partition Plan is inherently an ethnic nationalist solution, as it involves moving borders to fit posited national identities and/or moving/eliminating populations to create more homogenous political units such that Jews and Arabs are to settle in their own territory. 

  While two-state sovereignty seems plausible in theory, the fact that the Partition Plan has been proposed but still not yet instated signals a lesser plausibility in practice as a result of historically-claimed sentiments. Jewish settlements in Palestinian-claimed land (the West Bank and Gaza) make it harder to form a contiguous Palestinian state, in addition to power imbalances and external interference (esp. US) forming further impediments. 

  ***

  It is, I believe, much easier to argue for nationalism as a source of disorder, given the failure of the two-state solution (and the unlikelihood of the one-state solution). Both Israeli and Palestinian nationalism are exclusionary, preventing a peaceful resolution. The long history of violence and distrust means sovereignty alone won’t ensure stability. There exists a mutual fear of existential threats: Palestinians fear permanent occupation and displacement while Israelis fear loss of Jewish identity and security.

  The main difficulty for nationalists, and often the root of the nationalist conflict, lies in establishing a consensus on legitimate claim to land and self-determination. Historically, Jews were there first (ancient Israel), but Palestinians have lived there continuously for centuries, so deciding who has the stronger historical claim depends on the timeframe. Legitimacy is not solely contingent on history though, and can involve legal and moral considerations. Legally, Israel is legally recognized as a state, but its occupation of Palestinian territories is not. Palestinians have legal claims under international law, but lack full sovereignty. Morally, it depends on whether you prioritize historical justice for Jews (after centuries of persecution) or justice for Palestinians (who were displaced and continue to suffer under occupation). However, opponents of the legitimacy debate posit that neither side has an exclusive claim, and the solution should focus on coexistence on shared land and human rights rather than historical ownership.

  This leads to the proposal of the one-state solution. Beinart argues that the two-state solution is dead and implausible, and that a binational state should guarantee equal rights. Beinart and Roy, both offering perspectives from Jewish nationals having personally witnessed Palestinian life under occupation, are cognizant that establishing two states simply comes at too high a cost (human (well-being/mortality), infrastructural, military, resources etc.) The essential idea is that insisting for sovereignty and national identity rather than settling for protection of rights for both sides, or a more inclusive one-state, multiple-ethnic identities nation is what’s causing and prolonging disorder, and it would be so much easier if we can just settle on recognition of both identities under a neutral state − with Israel and Palestine as sub-states where people’s citizenships and rights are fully recognized. It’s not entirely clear that sovereignty really matters more than human rights protections (some nuance in this view, but when state interests overshadow that of individuals on a disproportionately large scale, it no longer seems as though the state truly does represent the interests of people it is meant to represent.) The one-state solution can, then, also be seen as a nationalist view, but a civic one, as this is essentially ‘changing the definition of national identity to fit reality’, which is ‘the least coercive and most promising path to national unity’ according to Fukuyama.

  Once again, solutions seem plausible in theory but not in practice, and such is the case with the one-state solution as well. We ought not to ignore Miller’s aforementioned point that mutual distrust makes civic nationalism hard to implement − and, with the 2023 war on Gaza, any ounce of remaining mutual trust has been completely decimated. Ethnic nationalism remains dominant. Nationalism, in its current ethnic form, has produced disorder rather than stability, and while civic nationalism might work in theory, it lacks feasibility in this case. 

  ***

  All in all, nationalism has caused more disorder than order in the Israel-Palestine conflict because of its ethnic, exclusionary nature and the failure of viable solutions to accommodate both sides. I have first outlined the conflict, and demonstrated that the current violent disorder had only fully erupted following the rise of nationalism (Zionism, then Palestinian nationalism). I then link nationalism and order in the following way − the exclusivity of ethnic nationalism to disorder, and the inclusivity of civic nationalism to order, but argue that while nationalism could theoretically be a force for order (whether through a two-state or civic nationalist one-state solution), historical realities prevent its practical success (either way). I ultimately believe that rather than prioritizing nationalist claims, the focus should shift to human rights, security, and coexistence, but remain skeptical of its feasibility.

• DPT: “Democratic peace theory exemplifies the weaknesses of liberal accounts of the international order”. Discuss.

  [Essay plan]

  Introduction

  Democratic peace theory (DPT) is the theory that posits that democracies rarely, if ever, fight with/go to war with other democracies (but do fight with non-democracies). Though one of the most famous findings in IR scholarship, it is also widely contested, whether empirically, logically and conceptually. DPT is a subset of liberalism, as it provides empirical support for the liberal claim that democracy contributes to a more peaceful international order. The liberal account of international relations runs in opposition to the realist account, and posits that international peace, stability and mutual cooperation is possible through establishing international institutions, promoting democracy and economic interdependence, as opposed to the realist assumption that international politics is simply a struggle for power among self-interested states.

  Disambiguating DPT

  1. Definitions: democracy, war

     1. Democracy (from Barkawi and Laffey): 

        1. classical sense of ‘direct rule by the people’ (often feared by elites due to its association with instability and wealth redistribution)

        2. over time, liberal democracy emerged through class struggles, especially with industrialization and the rise of mass politics.

        3. liberal democracy shaped by capitalism — it reinforces market structures and limits radical democratic expressions

        4. procedural definition of democracy (elections, institutions) obscures its deeper social and economic foundations

     2. Liberal democracy (from Owen): 

        1. A state is a liberal democracy if liberalism is the prevailing ideology, shaping political and societal norms.

        2. It has free speech, regular competitive elections, and citizen influence over war decisions.

        3. Liberals believe individuals prioritize self-preservation and material well-being, requiring freedom and peace.

        4. Democracies are seen as pacific and trustworthy, while non-democracies are perceived as threats due to differing objectives (e.g., conquest, plunder).

        5. Leaders in liberal democracies face institutional and public constraints that make war with other democracies unlikely but allow for war against non-democracies.

     3. War (from Barkawi and Laffey): 

        1. War is historically contingent — its nature and conduct evolve over time

        2. Traditional definitions (e.g., Correlates of War dataset) focus on state-based, interstate war, but this ignores other forms of conflict

           1. Total war (e.g., World Wars) led to bureaucratization, mass mobilization, and militarization of Western democracies

           2. Post-1945, nuclear deterrence and proxy wars shifted war away from direct interstate conflict, especially among core states

        3. Conventional war definitions obscure how force is used in imperial, interventionist, or proxy conflicts

  2. Types of DPT: monadic, dyadic and systemic

     1. monadic DPT: democracies are in general more peaceful in their international relations

     2. dyadic DPT: democracies do not go to war with other democracies (oh but this doesn’t mean they can’t go to war with non-democracies)

     3. systemic DPT: more democratic states in the international system makes the international system more peaceful

  3. Explanations of DPT: institutional and normative 

     1. institutional DPT: democratic institutions (e.g., elections, checks and balances, public opinion) create constraints that make leaders more accountable, reducing their ability to engage in war impulsively

     2. normative DPT: democracies share common political values like negotiation, compromise, and peaceful dispute resolution, which extend to foreign relations

  Support for DPT

  1. DPT is empirically ‘robust’ - it is true that democracies and democracies don’t go to war

     1. Zone of Peace

     2. DPT explains historical trends - account for long-standing peace among Western democracies → challenge: Eurocentrism

  2. DPT is theoretically valuable - challenges realism by suggesting regime type influences war and peace 

     1. Owen - How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace

     2. Kant - Perpetual Peace

     3. DPT’s normative appeal - supports democracy as a morally superior/peaceful system 

  3. DPT’s policy implications - justifies democracy promotion as a strategy for global stability

     1. Encourages institutional development - highlights the role of democratic norms and checks on executive power in reducing conflict

  Weaknesses of DPT

  1. Definitional weaknesses

     1. DPT contingent on narrow definitions of democracy and war, but these definitions are highly contextualized and can change over time re: globalization (?) (Barkawi and Laffey)

     2. Slipperiness of terms ‘democracy’ and ‘war’ (Owen) → temptation of tautological definitions that define terms in such a way that safeguards DPT validity

  2. More empirical challenges to DPT

     1. Democratic peace theorists contend that the theory is validated by a large number of cases. However, a powerful argument can be made that the universe of cases from which it can be tested is actually quite small (Layne)

        1. if the theory's empirical support is based on a small-N universe, this magnifies the importance of possible exceptions to the rule that democracies do not fight each other (for example, World War I, the War between the States, the War of 1812). 

     2. Selection bias/endogeneity issues: selected cases favor DPT bc pacifying effect of democratic norms and culture was bolstered by complementary factors (e.g. economic interdependence, or special ties linking the disputants)

  3. Little agreement on the mechanisms causing DPT: 

     1. some say it is public opinion but authoritarian public opinion in China following similar patterns challenges it (Bell and Quek)

  4. Flawed causal logic of DPT

     1. Normative and institutional logic (Rosato)

        1. Normative: failure of norm externalization (esp under conflicting interests)

        2. Institutional: failure of accountability  mechanisms

  5. Realpolitik considerations: Transition to democracy war-prone (Mansfield and Snyder) 

     1. Democratization is statistically found to be a war-prone process

  6. Different types of DPT can conflict with each other

     1. Dyadic DPT (for democracies that go to war with non-democracies) contradicts monadic DPT (which claims democracies are generally more peaceful overall regardless of opponent’s regime type)

        1. Many democracies still go to war with non-democracies − The Costs of War Project demonstrating how post-9/11 US + its military interventions lead to instability, w/ significant human, economic, social consequences

  How many of these challenges to DPT spill over to liberalism?

  1. Disambiguating liberalism

  1. Main idea (recall, from essay 1): Liberalism is essentially the challenge to the egoism assumption, or rather a proof of the possibility of mutual gain through cooperation − imagine the social contract theory wherein actors are states

  2. Core assumptions:

     1. States are not the only key actors: international institutions exist (UN, WTO, NATO) and help facilitate cooperation, mediate disputes, and establish norms that promote peace.

     2. Democratic peace theory: democratic states are more peaceful and less likely to engage in war with each other.

     3. Economic interdependence makes cooperation possible: trade and economic ties reduce incentives for conflict by making war economically costly.

     4. Human rights and norms: ideas, norms and human rights shape state behavior

  3. Criticisms & limitations:

  1. Liberalism underestimates power politics

  2. Liberalism ignores democratic interventions/wars

  3. Liberalism assumes cooperation is always possible

  2. The subset relationship: DPT is a subset of liberalism

  1. + DPT's flaws (e.g., interventionism, defining war narrowly, ignoring structural violence) expose deeper weaknesses in liberal IR theory — such as its optimism about cooperation and assumption that democracy inherently promotes peace.

  2. − DPT is just one aspect of liberalism, and even if it has weaknesses, other liberal arguments (economic ties, institutions) still hold explanatory power.

  Returning to the question

  1. Does democratic peace theory exemplify the weaknesses of liberal accounts of the international order?

     1. Yes, to an extent

        1. DPT is a core empirical support for liberalism

           1. If DPT is false then liberalism only has theoretical grounding

     2. To what extent?

        1. Democratic peace theory is not entirely flawed

        2. Democratic peace theory is simply one of various subsets of liberalism

           1. Attacking DPT does not necessarily attack:

              1. viability of mutual cooperation

              2. importance of economic interdependence

              3. importance of int’l institutions

              4. importance of norms

           2. all of which are promoted by liberalism.

           3. DPT may make us rethink the way we think about these things but attacking DPT only attacks one pillar of liberalism

  Conclusion

  Statement is only true to an extent, by virtue of DPT being a subset of liberalism. 

  • DPT has strong empirical (and theoretical) support, but has definitional, conceptual, causal, and application flaws that affect the empirical strength of DPT

  • DPT, while an important subset of liberalism, is not the only sustaining factor of liberalism and should not be viewed interchangeably

  The validity or falsity of DPT ≠ the validity or falsity of liberalism

• Culture and International Conflict: Does Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ theory tell us anything significant about contemporary international conflicts?

  Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (CoC) theory (1996) argues that post-Cold War international conflicts are primarily cultural rather than ideological, political, or economic. This framework appears compelling in light of tensions such as those between the West and the Islamic world post-9/11, the U.S. and China, and Russia and Ukraine. It introduces a cultural dimension often overlooked in traditional IR theories (realism, liberalism, constructivism, etc.), yet its explanatory power remains limited. I will first outline Huntington’s theory in detail before assessing it through three lenses: empirical validity, explanatory power, and cultural dimension. I argue that while CoC appears empirically valid in certain contexts, its explanatory power is limited, and its greatest contribution lies in foregrounding culture in IR theory despite its oversimplifications.

  To reiterate, the Clash of Civilizations theory’s main thesis is that ‘the most important distinctions among peoples are [no longer] ideological, political, or economic… [t]hey are cultural’ (Huntington, 1996); and that new patterns of conflict will occur along boundaries of different cultures and patterns of cohesion found within those boundaries. Huntington identifies these cultural boundaries as eight major civilizations − Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American, African − specified as follows:

  1. Sinic: the common culture of China and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia; incl. Vietnam and Korea.

  2. Japanese: Japanese culture as distinctively different from the rest of Asia.

  3. Hindu: identified as the core Indian civilization.

  4. Islamic: originating on the Arabian Peninsula, spread across North Africa, Iberian Peninsula and Central Asia. Arab, Turkic, Persian and Malay are among the many distinct subdivisions within Islam.

  5. Orthodox: centered in Russia. Separate from Western Christendom.

  6. Western: centered in Europe and North America.

  7. Latin American: Central and South American countries with a past of a corporatist, authoritarian culture. Majority of countries are of a Catholic majority.

  8. Africa: while the continent lacks a sense of a pan-African identity, Huntington claims that Africans are also increasingly developing a sense of African Identity.

  Huntington’s theory describes the temporal evolution of relationships among these civilizations in three main phases: (1) the pre-circumnavigation (before the 16th century) age where civilizations were separated geographically leading to slow (centuries-long) spread of ideas and technology; (2) evolution in ocean navigation by Western civilizations (by the 16th century) where rapid expansion and Western ideas, values, religion etc. led to Western culture’s eventual domination; (3) a shifting balance of civilizations (beginning in the 20th century) moving beyond the unidirectional influence of the west on the rest towards ‘multidirectional interactions among all civilization’, creating interdependence of cultural influence between civilizations. 

  Focusing on the 20th-century onwards Huntington characterizes contemporary civilizational dynamics through three main patterns: (1) shifting balance of civilizations; (2) emerging order of civilizations; and (3) clashes of civilizations. 

  Shifting balance of civilizations shows fading Western power and influence (albeit a very slow and non-linear/unpredictable process) and a relative rise in power and influence of non-Western countries (particularly Japan, China and the Four Tigers of Asia − Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore) complemented by a decreasing responsiveness to Western demands and interests − as Huntington asserts, the world is modernizing (but not Westernizing), e.g. the resurgence of Islam ‘embodies the acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and the recommitment to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world’.

  Emerging order of civilizations coincides with a realignment following the post-Cold War dissolution of the bipolar world order. During the Cold War, the bipolar world order enabled countries to identify themselves as either aligned (with either the US or the USSR) or non-aligned (didn’t actively participate in either bloc). In the post-Cold War world order, countries are no longer able to easily categorize themselves and have entered into an identity crisis. Countries, then, may appeal to rallying around cultural fault lines, creating cleavages where divides are decided through religion, ancestry, language, values, institutions etc. 

  Clashes of civilizations, as Huntington predicts, follows a pattern in which Islamic and Sinic cultures form a coalition against a common enemy − the West − whom they collectively see as a force attempting to maintain their status as a superior cultural hegemony. Islamic conflict with the West (and Christianity) deepens with the West’s attempt at value universalization coinciding with the resurgence and reaffirmation of the relevance of Islam, all while increased communication and interaction amplifies differences between the two cultures/ religions and removal of the common threat of communism. As for Asia and China, their recent economic success has created an increased sense of cultural relevancy, which in combination with China’s heightened military power could result in a major world conflict, intensified by alignments between Islamic and Sinic civilizations. All in all, CoC primarily focuses on conflicts between the West and the Islamic and Sinic civilizations − and while Huntington discusses other civilizations (e.g. tension between Orthodox vs. the West through Russia-Ukraine/NATO, or Hindu civilization as a ‘swing’ civilization), he sees them as less central to global conflict.

  CoC seems empirically valid initially: contemporary international conflicts do seem to increasingly reflect a trend of increasing identity-based tensions, given the rise of conflicts post-9/11 and a subsequent increasing cultural divide between the West and the Islamic world, as well as the US-China rivalry being hallmarks of 21st-century international conflict. The rise of American Islamophobia in the US post-9/11 (Beydoun, 2018) reflects the ‘us-vs-them’ civilizational framing of conflicts with Muslim-majority countries by Western societies as Huntington posited. On the other hand, Jihadist movements like ISIS frame their struggle as a war between civilizations (Roy, 2016), reinforcing CoC’s argument that cultural and religious identity define global conflicts.

  While this trend has its seeming empirical validities, we can’t, by this fact, then simply assume CoC to be true. Culture and identity makes up one factor, and many contemporary clashes do not fit Huntington’s West vs. Islam/Sinic framework in reality: non-cultural factors — political, economic, and historical — often play just as, if not more significant roles than identity alone. Huntington’s framework has often been criticized for oversimplifying cultures and ignoring intra-civilizational tensions. 

  Said (2001) has criticized Huntington for artificially dividing civilizations and reinforcing divisive rhetoric rather than offering a nuanced understanding of global politics − in a Seeing Like a State (Scott, 1998)-esque fashion of forcing legibility and simplification onto nuanced conflict dynamics. For instance, Tunisia as a successful (albeit rare) case of democratic transition post-Arab Spring in the Islamic world (Ghannouchi, 2018) shows that Islam and Western values like democracy are not necessarily incompatible or mutually exclusive (whereas CoC would claim Islamic and Western values (e.g., democracy, secularism) are inherently opposed). Even Roy (providing empirical support for Jihadist civilizational hostility towards the West as aforementioned) also argues that Jihadist movements are not only driven by cultural clashes but also by additional political and ideological factors, meaning CoC is only a partial explanation. 

  Given the above, CoC has some empirical validity given some alignment in global trends of conflict but the empirical support is not entirely robust. But even if some trends align, does CoC actually explain them well enough? I argue that its explanatory power is even weaker than its empirical support, for two main reasons: (1) we can’t (and shouldn’t) conflate correlation with causation; (2) measuring civilizational clashes is difficult provided there is limited, if any, meaningful way to ‘measure’ culture or ‘civilizational identity’ as a causal factor − there are more empirically robust and tangible explanations for conflict that CoC can’t provide.

  It is easy to assume that simply because contemporary conflict trends align with CoC predictions (whereas pre-Cold War conflicts − when CoC doesn’t quite apply − don’t quite explain it well), clashes of civilization theories explain why conflicts occur. But that makes the logical mistake of conflating correlation with causation. For instance, post-9/11 conflicts, while involve an Islam-Western clash, may not necessarily be ‘caused’ by the civilizational clash. Political history (colonial legacies, U.S. intervention), economic grievances, and state interests also shape these wars. CoC describes tensions but doesn’t prove that culture is the main driver − just because many conflicts involve identity or cultural differences does not mean culture is the root cause.

  With this, we should also note that culture/civilization/identity is not a static independent variable. Unlike economic or military indicators (which much of political science relies on, e.g. GDP, trade, military spending etc.), there are no clear metrics for cultural identity or its direct causal impact on conflict. We can potentially attempt to use proxy variables (e.g. religious/ethnic demographics, voting patterns, media rhetoric), conflict mapping (e.g. frequency of inter-civilizational vs. intra-civilizational wars) or even public opinion surveys on identity-based tensions, but even with these we can easily run into correlation-causation traps, and cultural factors often overlap with political/economic motives in murky middle-ground ways. For instance, to attribute the failure of democracy in the Arab world (Journal of Democracy, 2015) to ‘Islamic civilization’ is too vague for meaningful analysis; rather, turning to alternative explanations (realism, constructivism) might offer stronger causal mechanisms, e.g. authoritarian legacies, weak institutions, economic instability, etc. This is not to say religion and culture have no impact, however significant, but that to measure it meaningfully is difficult and that it provides flimsy explanation for conflict, especially since cultures are dynamic and adaptable, rather than rigid and destined to clash (Rodriguez-Garcia, 2010). 

  Yet where CoC lacks in empirical validity and explanatory power, it makes up in providing a fresh cultural dimension perspective that traditional IR theory (i.e. realism, liberalism and constructivism) does not fully cover. While realist perspectives are (as aforementioned) likely to have stronger explanatory power with it shedding light on factors such as power struggles and security dilemmas between states as catalysts for conflict, it downplays identity, religion, and ideology, treating states as rational actors focused only on material power. CoC compensates for where realism lacks by recognizes non-material factors like civilizational identity as a source of conflict: for instance, by framing US-China tensions as a West-Sinic civilizational struggle rather than just power politics there is an added dimension of culture that the materially-focused realism simply does not capture. While liberalism seemingly makes up for the added depth by introducing non-material lines of discussion through positing the possibility of cooperation through institutions, democracy, and economic interdependence, it still struggles to explain persistent cultural tensions despite economic ties (e.g. why US-China rivalry intensifies despite deep trade relations). CoC can then step in by suggesting that deep-rooted cultural differences override economic cooperation in shaping global conflicts. The constructivist lens is closest to capturing CoC as it highlights the role of identity and discourse but focuses on social construction rather than inherent civilizational divisions, and doesn’t quite explain why certain identity groups continuously clash over time. CoC provides a macro-level framework by categorizing civilizations as distinct units with historical tensions. CoC doesn’t fully explain conflict, but it introduces identity/civilizational dynamics that IR theory often neglects, and it shifts the lens from states and institutions to deeper cultural fault lines, making it a useful (though flawed) complement to existing theories.  

  All in all, does Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations theory tell us anything significant about contemporary international conflicts? CoC posits that, with the end of the bipolar world order post-Cold War, countries realign themselves by civilizational groups rather than ideologies or alignment with the bipolar order, and the main clashes of conflict are between West and Islam-Sinic groups, especially with the (slow-) fading influence of the West as a cultural hegemony and the growing affirmation of Islam and influence of Sinic superpowers. I argue it has significance in attributing a theory to a visible empirical trend of rising tensions between US-Islam post-9/11 and the US-China conflict, but is obviously oversimplified, ignores other civilizations and intra-civilizational conflicts. It is also hard to measure meaningfully and so lacks robust explanatory power, but its greatest power is in providing an added cultural dimension to IR not adequately captured by realism, liberalism, or even constructivism.