Practice of Politics

Michaelmas 2023

• State strength: Do the origins of states determine what they can do?

  States are the governmental entities responsible for the imposition and enforcement of rules over the population of a certain governing region or territory, or as German sociologist Max Weber famously defines, ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ [1]. States form the foundations of social order and cohesion in almost all nations, and their ability and capacity to organize society is largely determined by the methods which they utilize their power over their governing territories. How they utilize their power is, in turn, influenced by various factors - from how the existing political frameworks and structures are set up, to the resources and capital available to the state, to the state’s relations with other nations.

  The origins of states refer to the historical factors that have influenced, and processes by which a central governmental or political entity has formed that had not existed prior. The processes of state formation widely vary across times and spaces, and form and are formed by unique circumstances which shape the development of each state. Nevertheless, there are generalized trends in origins of states that provide a wider glimpse at the various types of state formations that have existed throughout history: tribal and agricultural origins of ancient states gave rise to organized central powers [2], and sooner the formation of city-states and elaborate political governance systems; medieval state origins brought about the rise of empires and feudalist states [3]; and eventually, the wave of colonialism and subsequent decolonization greatly facilitated the formation of most modern states we know of today.

  States have the power to influence a broad range of aspects of their governing territories. Some of the states’ primary functions are that of governance and legislation, involving the making, passing and interpreting of laws and policies; maintenance of security and order through the establishment of law enforcement agencies such as the police; defense and national security through the establishment of armed forces including a national military base; provision of public services such as education, healthcare and infrastructural development such as transportation, water, electricity and telecommunications; economic regulation through the monitoring and implementation of various economic policies; and managing and mediating international relations through participation in international organizations, negotiations of treaties etc. The ways in which states decide to carry out these functions are determined in itself by various factors, including but not limited to the legal and constitutional framework of a state, political system and governance structure, economic capacity and resources, as well as its relationships with other nations.

  The origins of states are thus a significant determinant of what states can do — i.e. it has a direct influence over a state’s functions — as it establishes the legal or constitutional framework as well as the political structure under which a state operates, and influences the legitimacy and stability of a state.

  A state’s origins can determine the legal and constitutional framework and political system that they operate in, which in turn delineates what a state has power to do. Often, the political system created by the state is very much aligned with the prevailing political values of the state founders and/or society at the time of state formation. This political system and its underpinning political ideologies form the legal and constitutional framework which outlines the various laws and regulations that states are allowed to enact. States that have originated from a colonial history will likely follow the constitutional frameworks of their colonizers. For instance, the formation of the colonial Indian state originated from the imperialist era when the British Empire sought to expand its territorial and trading powers; the formation and expansion of the East India Company [4] laid a solid foundation for the establishment of the British colonial state of India. India’s abundance of commodities such as Indian textiles, silk, cotton, tea, spices, indigo etc. [5] was a significant factor that facilitated the emergence of colonial India, as it provided the foundation of an abundance of resources for Britain to grow its empire’s trade and economic power. The imperialist political ideologies that predominated the British empire focused heavily on the facilitation of trade and hegemony to expand the empire’s economic power and territorial dominance, such that the British Crown established the state of colonial India through the Government of India Act (1858) which provided that India was to be governed directly by the Crown, involving the transfer of all of East India Company’s assets and properties to the Crown [4]. This allowed the state to directly manage trade without a privately owned intermediary, and rule India according to British legislative frameworks. Likewise, states emerging from decolonization or revolution gain a newfound autonomous power to develop a new set of self-determined rules and frameworks that adhere more to the traditional political values of the nation. Using the establishment of the Constitution of India as an example, the incorporation of democratic principles, fundamental rights, and a federal system allows for the Indian state to act according to their own principles and govern autonomously. Another significant example is the origin of the United States: the American Revolution led to American independence from British colonial rule and subsequently the formation of the United States. The United States’s revolutionary origins propelled the drafting of the Constitution, "the oldest written constitution still in use today" [6]; the framework laid down in the late 18th century extends its influence to US’s state functions in the modern age, exhibiting the longstanding temporal extent of influence of strong legislative frameworks.

  The origins of a state also determine a state’s legitimacy and stability, which have a considerable influence on the solidity of states’ power. Precisely defined, ‘a state is more legitimate the more that it is treated by its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political power’ [7]. How a state’s origins play a part in the determination of its legitimacy can be seen through (a) the involvement and support of the people during the process of formation, and (b) how well the established constitution of the state supports the welfare of its citizens with the power it holds. The former factor (a) may look particularly at the sociopolitical context of the state’s formation, e.g. states born out of revolutions or independence movements may be more likely to be treated as legitimate by its citizens as such movements likely stand for the citizens’ best interests; opposingly, states from authoritarian origins or external impositions are likely to be perceived as coercive and illegitimate. The latter factor (b) looks at the ways that a state utilizes its power. A state that legitimately utilizes its power is one that can preserve the individual freedom of its citizens by preventing them from entering a ‘state of nature’, a state in which people act without intervention and consideration of others; while simultaneously ensuring that the power they exert does not excessively impose on citizens’ right to live and act freely, at least according to the contractarian view wherein the ‘creation of the state results from a social contract between individuals in the state of nature in which state provides security in exchange for obedience from the citizen’ [1]. Using Somalia, a notoriously ‘failed state’ as an example, it underwent 14 unsuccessful attempts at establishing a national government. This had been the case as each time an attempt at establishing a state was made, it had been originated from military coups, civil wars or the like, and a dire sense of divisionism between opposing powers, such as Somalia’s opposition with Ethiopia, and the later tensions between the UIC (Union of Islamic Courts) and the TFG (Transitional Federal Government) [1]. From such tumultuous and divisive origins, the Somalian state is significantly weakened and subsequently so is its ability to govern Somalian territory. It is said that Somalia in 1993 has ‘no army, no state bureaucracy, no state to provide basic infrastructure (water, electricity, road maintenance, schools, health services), and an immigration system so underdeveloped that there is a lack of a passport-stamping service and thus no evidence of entering and leaving country is left. Water wells are guarded by armed gangs, diesel was society’s most precious commodity, and 4WD vehicles armed with heavy machine guns roamed the streets’ [1]. The legitimacy of a state thus determines a state’s competence to carry out and fulfill its functions.

  The contrary can be argued, however, that the origins of states is insignificant in its influence over the functions of a state. All states undergo evolution, and oftentimes such evolution is significant enough to override or fundamentally change the foundations laid down by a state’s origins - either creating a more vast and expansive set of state functions in a progressive manner, or even stripping states of previous functionality through a decline or deterioration in state functioning in the state’s process of evolution. The direct control or influence upon the state’s functions that a state’s origins have is consequently lost over evolution, such that state origins are not so much a ‘determinant’ than a mere starting point. For instance, since the American constitution had been established, America has undergone major changes such as the abolition of slavery, the rise of civil rights movements, the introduction of women’s suffrage and gender equality, and significant economic, industrial and technological developments that have drastically altered the American political landscape, and subsequently, what the American government can do. America has since gained the legislative power to punish any practice of enslavement by the Slavery Abolition Act of 1865 [8], to guarantee women the right to vote in all US States by the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 [9], to 'prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin' by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [10]. These new powers attributed to the state are directly influenced by the state's development rather than its origin.

  However, it can also be taken into consideration that a large portion of the Constitution remains unchanged since its ratification. For instance, the Second Amendment ratified in 1791, which provides ‘the right of the people to keep and bear Arms…’ [11], has remained constant throughout the centuries, and is very much influenced by the sociohistorical context of late-18th century America under which Americans, including the Founding Fathers, believed the individual right to self-defense against potential tyranny was necessary for citizens following a period of oppression under British rule [12]. Despite the evolution of the US into its modern state where the necessity and safety of gun ownership has been widely debated [13], the Constitution continues to protect individuals’ rights to bear arms from being infringed upon, showing another example in which the direct influence of ideologies prevalent during a state’s origins manifest in what the state can do over lasting periods of time, withstanding a state’s evolution and development.

  All in all, in spite of the everchanging nature of states, their origins have deep-rooted impact on the functions of states as they set the foundations upon which a state establishes and develops their power upon. Some states are more malleable than others, and it can be properly assumed that states with a longstanding history may have evolved its functions more than recently founded states. Ultimately, it is important to understand the impacts of state origins on their functions to understand the parts of a state that can or cannot be changed, while simultaneously keeping in mind that states naturally diverge from their origins and develop in complex and nuanced ways to keep up with the growing needs and ideals of its population.

  (1924 words)

  [This is a good start, Seraph. It's clear that you've read. Be sure to focus on the readings for the week that are set, although it's perfectly fine (and even encouraged) to read around on your own. The big thing for you to work on for your next essay is to engage with the question more directly and to answer the question--yes or no. That may take some getting used to, but it's essential in an Oxford essay/exam.

  Try to make simple points that back up your thesis statement. And be sure to plan your argument. It will help if you have a detailed plan, as you'll be able to make adjustments for the logic of the argument, so that you're sure you agree with it. Essays aren't really a place to show the tutor what you've read; rather, they're about using the knowledge you've gained over the course of the previous week to take a position and make an argument that you can defend in the tutorial.

  Good start, keep working on tightening up your argument.]

• Democracy and authoritarianism: Does our definition of democratic regression depend on our definition of democracy?

  ‘Democracy’ has become an essential keyword of the modern political sphere, one that dominates much of modern political discourse; the idea of democracy seems to be an ideal model of governance that most aspire to follow, but consensus on the precise definition of democracy is yet to be reached. As more and more countries around the world grew the inclination to strive for a successfully democratic mode of operation in a wave of democratization, many countries later found, or are finding themselves undergoing a period of democratic regression, particularly in the 21st century wherein countries may find themselves retreating to a mode of autocracy as a result of weakened functions of its democratic state.

  To understand what this ‘ideal’ of democracy is and how it may undergo ‘democratic regression’, a clear definition of both needs to be obtained. This is difficult with the various nuances involved, so first a prerequisite definition of both terms will be established, which will serve as a baseline for the various interpretations to be explored: Democracy is a form of governance wherein state power is vested in the people, or the general population of a state; while democratic regression is the process of the weakening of democratic institutions, which American sociologist Larry Diamond explains that it occurs through the ‘incremental strangulation of democracy by elected executives who gradually eviscerate institutional checks, political opposition, independent media and other forces of scrutiny and resistance in civil society’ (Diamond). The ‘democratic institutions’ mentioned in this definition can thus be understood as the ‘institutional checks, political opposition, independent media and other forces of scrutiny and resistance’ Diamond mentions, and such institutions can be thought of to be what upholds the ‘power vested in the people’ as mentioned in the definition of democracy.

  The above prerequisite foundations should help us to understand and break down the definition of democracy a bit better. What does it mean for state power to be ‘vested in the people’? In simple definition, this means that people are allowed to have a say or influence in the decision-making of a state, as opposed to, say, an autocracy. This may entail the regular holding of ‘fairly conducted and honestly counted’ elections (Schmitter and Karl), the freedom of expression of public contestation, as well as the existence of and continuous power held by various checks and balances such as ‘parliament, the courts, impartial officials, and media and civil society’ (James et al.). Schmitter and Karl exhibit this through concisely establishing this principle of democracy: ‘by the contingent consent of politicians acting under conditions of bounded uncertainty’ - meaning politicians are bounded by a degree of uncertainty where ‘those who win greater electoral support or influence over policy will not use their temporary superiority to bar the losers from taking office or exerting influence in the future’ through various means of repressing opposition. When the factor of uncertainty is lost and one party gains absolute power without the freedom for contestation, the essence of democracy may be considered ‘lost’ and hence democratic regression occurs, which explains how the weakening of the aforementioned democratic institutions lend itself to reduced power to the people and as a result the breakdown of democracy.

  So in what ways does the definition of democracy vary? From the above, we may find variants in the definition of democracy through various interpretations of the extent of power and rights that can be held by the people, the state, and other agents of opposition. Such interpretations will affect the definition of democratic regression, since the criterion for what constitutes a deteriorating democracy would be dependent on the criterion for a successful democracy. This essay will argue that our definition of democratic regression does in fact depend on our definition of democracy, in virtue of:

  1. the variance in standards between minimalist and substantive definitions of democracy; and

  2. the variance in focal democratic priorities between different democratic theories.

  Firstly, a minimalist or procedural definition of democracy may hold lower standards for what constitutes a democracy as opposed to substantive democracy, which may in turn raise the threshold for what constitutes democratic regression. For instance, the view of electoralism holds the ‘faith that merely holding elections will channel political action into peaceful contests among elites and accord public legitimacy to the winners’ (Schmitter and Karl), a ‘bare-minimum’ requirement for democracy. Electoralist views may believe that as long as regularly held elections are in place, it still fulfills the sufficient definitions for a democracy; in such a definition, even if a country experiences a rise in gerrymandering or social exclusion, or when ‘specific parties or candidates are excluded, or in which substantial portions of the population cannot freely participate’ (Schmitter and Karl), their system of governance will still not be considered as undergoing democratic regression. On the contrary, substantive definitions of democracy may encompass a wider scope of criteria; on top of an inclusive electoral system that does not marginalize or exclude minority groups, they may also demand for protection of civil liberties, freedom of speech and/or rule of law. The American democracy is a prime example of how minimalist and substantive democratic views may hold contrasting measurements for democratic regression: while America still holds regular elections quadrennially, fitting the electoralist view of democracy insofar that it holds regularly held elections, American democracy, particularly under the Trump administration, would likely be considered as regressing under substantive views. Trump, despite ostensibly advocating for the opposition of bigotry and an all-embracing American nationalism, tends to portray white Americans, particularly those with traditionalist and conservative views, as victims of changing liberal policies aiming to promote the rights of people of color (Smith and King), who were historically marginalized and are now obstructed by Trump’s color-blind rhetoric from reclaiming their civil liberties. By the substantive conceptions of democracy, such obstructions from certain groups claiming their civil liberties, or protectionist policies favoring certain groups over another, implicitly or explicitly, would imply a regression in democratic functions.

  Secondly, there exists different democratic priorities in different democratic theories, which will affect how democratic regression is examined. Electoral democracy prioritizes the presence of ‘meaningful, free and fair, and multi-party elections’ (“Electoral Democracy”) as a primary element of democracy (this differs from electoralism, where the fairness of elections is not considered); liberal democracy prioritizes not only multi-party elections, but also ‘the separation of powers, an independent judiciary and a system of checks and balances between branches of government and media plays the role of fourth estate’ (“Liberal Democracy”); consensus democracy prioritizes power distribution and power sharing (Hendriks) while social democracy prioritizes the incorporation of capitalism and socialism, i.e. maintaining a free market while upholding social justice and socioeconomic equality (Miller). If one examines the same country under a viewpoint of electoral democracy, the results may differ from if one examined it from a liberal, consensus, or social democratic perspective. For instance, the Hungarian democracy had experienced a concentration of power under the rule of Prime Minister Viktor Orban and the Fidesz party, in addition to an erosion of checks and balances, restrictions on media freedom, and weakening of judicial independence, which are values prioritized by a liberal democracy. Yet consensus democracy may place emphasis on high degrees of consensus among political groups, a criterion which Hungary seems to meet, in addition to the consistent maintenance of free and fair elections, allowing it to fit the criteria for electoral democracy. Another example of Venezuela, wherein voter fraud is a significant issue deteriorating the integrity of its electoral process, shows a country which would be considered democratically regressing according to the prioritization of free and fair elections in the view of electoral democracy; however Venezuela’s policies targeting the reduction of poverty and inequality would lend itself to an improvement in social democracy, yet again showing how different priorities of democratic qualities would lead to different interpretations of democratic regression, some even showing improvements in some aspects and deteriorations in others.

  However, it can be argued that the fundamental definition of democratic regression stays constant regardless of any nuance in the definition of democracy; democratic regression is purely the weakening of democratic institutions, and no matter the definition or interpretation of democracy we can still examine how changes may undermine free and fair elections, restrict civil liberties, weaken checks and balances, suppress political opposition, or undermine the rule of law. These indicators of democratic regression do not necessarily hinge upon the nuanced definitions of democracy, and can be assessed independently, for instance, the undermining of free and fair elections can easily be assessed if there has been voter suppression etc., restriction of civil liberties can be seen if there is some kind of suppression of media or free speech. Yet this view can be refuted, as the notion of ‘weakening’ democratic institutions still hinges upon what may or may not be considered weakening. A vague idea of democratic regression can stay constant, but some versions of democracy may be more lenient or place additional emphasis in assessing certain criteria than others, and specificity is necessary to identify where and how exactly might democratic functions fail, and the delineation of criteria for democracy is necessary in the standardization of measures of democratic regression to allow comparison between countries, for instance the criteria for Held’s models of democracy. One may also consider the viewpoint that if democratic functions fail to meet any one definition of democracy, it can be considered regression; however that in itself could count as an all-encompassing definition of democracy and therefore the idea returns to the fact that definitions of democracy are a necessary foundation for determining regression.

  All in all, our definition of democratic regression is still dependent on our definition of democracy. Although the fundamental principle of democratic backsliding regarding the erosion of democratic institutions does not vary, it is important to look at the precise factors that come into play within the dynamics of a democracy. While it may seem rather intuitive to deduce when a country is becoming less democratic, democratic regression cannot be precisely measured without a proper understanding of democracy. It is therefore important that we establish a fair and just definition of democracy that does not exclude or place disproportionate weightings on some criteria over others, and find a healthy balance between factors so that we reach a level of clarity with attaining democratic objectives.

  (1728 words)

• Countermajoritarian powers: Do counterpowers to democracy do different things, or are they all just that: counterpowers?

  Yes, counterpowers to democracy do different things in addition to their role of being a counterpower in a democratic system. Democracy is a system of government under which power is vested in the people, and citizens have a say in political decision-making. The various democratic processes in a democracy, such as free and fair elections, existence of political parties, checks and balances, legislative processes i.e. the formulation and enactment of laws, etc. are all decision-making mechanisms in democratic systems. Yet there exist various counterpowers to such democratic processes in any democratic political system. Counterpowers may be defined as groups (or individuals) that can ‘offset or check an opposing power’ (Merriam-Webster) - in a democratic context, this simply means any force or institution that can act as a check or limitation on governmental processes. The existence of counterpowers is essential to the safeguarding of democratic principles in a democracy - particularly the separation of powers to prevent an excessive concentration and/or abuse of powers by any one party in democratic systems. [Very nice introduction, Seraph.]

  Counterpowers in a democracy can come in many forms, from electoral institutions to civil societies or interest groups to international organizations to free press; this essay will concentrate on different counterpowers existing in governance systems, particularly exploring counterpower functions in bureaucracies, judiciaries, constitutionalism, federalism and bicameralism. These counterpowers can be said to all do different things, as they fundamentally operate under different frameworks and take different forms in its handling of democracy, and are all motivated by different objectives.

  Democratic counterpowers take different forms in their mode of operation, and subsequently, their framework of counterpowering democracy varies unequivocally. A key concept which underpins most democratic counterpowers is that of veto players, which are any ‘individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a change in the political status quo’ (Clark et al.). Institutional veto players are generated by a country’s constitution, and can include various entities such as federalism, bicameralism, constitutionalism and judiciaries. They all act as veto players, but do different things as they adopt different frameworks of governance.

  Federalism is a system of government in which ‘sovereignty is split between at least two territorial levels (e.g. national and local) so that independent governments have final authority in at least one policy realm. [Good—you’re starting out each point with clear definitions. Excellent.] Clark et al. make a distinction between de jure (federalism in practice) and de facto (federalism in structure) concepts of federalism. De jure federalism, referred to as federalism, denotes the constitutional designation of sovereignty, or authority to act independently of the other, in at least one policy realm for each territorial level, in addition to two other conditions of geopolitical division where a country must be divided into mutually exclusive regional governments, as well as having authoritative independence from one another. This does not necessarily guarantee federalism in practice or behavior of governments - that can be examined by looking at de facto federalism, referred to as decentralization, and looks at the extent to which ‘actual policymaking power lies within central or regional governments’. Decentralization is often most practically measured by the share of government revenue allocated to each territorial level as government budget constrains the ability for governments to conduct policy actions. Federalism serves as a counterpower, mostly in that it would reduce risk of tyranny by the central government through decentralization, as subnational governments could and would check each other; and also in that subnational governments are brought closer to the civilian citizen level because governments and citizens would have higher transparency with one another: policies can be tailored to citizens’ specific needs in territories, and citizens have better information about the government, allowing it to hold the government accountable easier as well. [Good!]

  Bicameralism, similar to federalism, is a system of governance involving the separation of powers, but instead according to of territorial levels, legislative deliberation is divided into two chambers - usually one upper chamber (often representing aristocracy, such as the Senate in Congress or House of Lords in Parliament) and one lower chamber (often representing the ‘people’, such as the House of Representatives in Congress and House of Commons in Parliament). Bicameralism aims to create a system of mixed government providing representation to both elites and common civilians in the discourse of legislation, arising from the need to prevent political systems degenerating into oligarchy following a period of predominantly aristocratic leadership. Lower and upper chambers check and balance each other by providing their respective perspectives: the lower chamber offers perspectives of the needs and wants of civilians, while members of the upper chamber possesses ‘supposed characters of knowledge, age, wisdom and training’ to improve upon the legislations the lower chamber proposes. [Good and accurate, too.] Bicameralism is an effective counterpower in this sense - providing an elaborate set of checks and balances and allowing for the representation of different interest groups, and requiring the approval of both chambers for legislation to be enacted.

  Constitutionalism is the ‘commitment of governments to accept legitimacy of and be governed by a set of authoritative rules and principles laid out in a constitution’ (Clark et al.). Constitutions are a formal source of state authority, and are crucial in setting limits on the exercise of power and providing a legal framework for governance. They work most effectively as a counterpower to democracy particularly when constitutions are entrenched, codified, has a bill of rights and, more importantly, has a mechanism of constitutional review established in place. Constitutional review grants an institution the authority to invalidate acts of government that violate constitutional rules, i.e. grants veto power to individuals in virtue of the constitution, which is the mechanism by which constitutionalism operates as a counterpower.

  Judiciaries are the ‘branch of government whose task is the authoritative adjudication of controversies over the application of laws in specific situations’ (Britannica). Judiciaries can come in varying forms across different countries - common law judiciaries are focused on the handling of individual cases, i.e. the facts and evidence presented in each case and the judges’ ultimate decision, while civil law judiciaries focus on the establishment of a ‘general principle of rules for settling all possible disputes among human beings’ (Murphy et al.). Either way, judges’ responsibilities are often delineated as to interpret and apply the law. Judges hold the crucial role of judicial review, allowing them to review the constitutionality and legality of laws, executive actions and government policies. While judges cannot necessarily change laws or constitutions, they have the power to interpret the law in a way that is congruent to the safeguarding and protection of human rights, and can strike down laws or executive actions if found to be unconstitutional. This allows judiciaries to be an effective counterpower, as they have the power to interpret and apply the law and subsequently act as a check or balance on the action of other branches of government.

  Bureaucracies are administrative institutions in a government run by unelected officials, and are responsible for the implementation and management of public policies, taking the form of departmental subdivisions working under a central government. While not an institutional veto player in the traditional sense in that it cannot necessarily block or veto policy changes, its procedural nature and expertise provides a sense of structure absent in electoral institutions. Bureaucracies are characterized by their complexity in organizational systems, and are typically seen as inefficient and redundant with its multilayered procedures and prioritization of procedural correctness. Bureaucratic inefficiency is often even seen as the imminent ‘problem with governance’ by political scholars (Meier). However, Meier argues that the problem with governance is in fact the deterioration of the performance of electoral institutions: electoral branches of government ‘have not resolved conflict in a reasoned manner’, and otherwise ‘have done so in a manner that undercuts effective public policy’ - conflicts in political goals, in accompaniment with the emphasis on competition and campaigning, have contributed to the deterioration in the efficiency of electoral institutions, and the predominant narrative that bureaucracy needs to be fixed is a detraction or misdirection from the real issue with governance. Bureaucracy can instead be seen as the solution or safeguard to democracy; electoral institutions lack ‘the normal tempering role of bureaucracy, the application of expertise to policy and policy proposals’, which bureaucracy as a counterpower makes up for. Bureaucracy performs most optimally in its role as a democratic counterpower, insofar as they are given clear goals, allocated adequate resources and given the autonomy to apply their expertise, and ideally also an active participant in the ‘discussion, design and implementation of public policy’.

  However, some comparative scholars recognize that despite taking different forms and structures, such institutions are conceptually the same: they all merely act as checks and balances and perform similar functions as veto players. For instance, both federalism and judiciaries may allow subnational governments or judges to block or modify policies they deem unconstitutional; both bicameralism and constitutionalism safeguard minority interests as bicameralism considers interests of different constituencies, while constitutionalism encompasses a bill of rights that protect the fundamental rights of citizens so that majoritarian rule will not infringe on boundaries of the minority; both federalism and bicameralism are able to decentralize and balance power through either separating them into national and subnational government units, or into an upper and lower chamber; judiciaries and bureaucracies both contribute to upholding the rule of law by ensuring political decisions are consistent with legal frameworks and established procedures - judiciaries can veto unconstitutional policies while bureaucracies can block or modify policies that do not adhere to their administrative procedures.

  While this may be a valid argument, counterpowers to democracy not only vary in their forms and structures, their differing objectives and motivations also lend to them doing different things. Counterpowers do not necessarily have being a democratic counterpower as their sole objective: their objectives and functions are inherently different. Take bureaucracy as the most prominent example: bureaucracies are ‘goal-oriented’ systems - they are not necessarily designed to veto electoral institutions or governments; they are more so motivated by goals assigned to them by the constitution, and can even be considered to be the bureaucracy’s raison d’être. They are primarily motivated by administering the execution of public policies, and are merely a potentially valuable asset in providing procedural structure and expertise to a democracy. Even with institutional veto players wherein checking and balancing is a significant objective, there exists variations in their motivations. For instance, federalism may be motivated by either the attainment of collective security (through voluntarily giving up their power in order to contribute to common pool resources), known as coming-together federalism, or the diffusion of secessionist pressures (through giving subnational government units more autonomy), referred to as holding-together federalism. Bicameralism, on the other hand, may be motivated by the protection of the federal system and promotion of the interests of different territorial units, or the improvement of legislative quality in the inclusion of both ‘aristocratic’/elite and civilian opinion. [Excellent points.] Constitutions are responsible for the establishment of governmental institutions and more recently a list of guaranteed rights: their function is not merely to enable counterpowers in the government, but is most importantly to protect basic citizen rights and ensure they are not infringed upon (Clark et al.).

  All in all, different counterpowers vary in what they do, from their methods and frameworks to their objectives and motives of operation. While it may be true that they all perform the same important function in a democracy of vetoing unconstitutional policy changes and decisions and acting as checks and balances upon one another, there exists sufficiently significant variation to say that they are more than just counterpowers, but are all core constituents of the democratic political framework and have individual roles that differ from one another.

  (1937 words)

  [Very good work, Seraph. Very good indeed. Just to re-emphasize one point—if you can integrate the points you make in the last two paragraphs into your discussion of the veto players (and feel free to cover fewer of them!), then your answer won’t appear so descriptive. The analysis should be the focus of your essay. That’s why I emphasize efficiency (saying as much as possible in as few words as possible): if you can efficiently get the descriptions out of the way, you’ll have more time and space to do the analysis, which is the most important part of your essay (and of  any answer in an exam).

  All this is an enormous improvement over both your other essays. You’re making really good progress—good job.]

Hilary 2024

• Social movements: What have social movements contributed to modern political practice?

  Social movements are “collective challenges [to elites, opponents, authorities etc.] based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities”. Modern political practice refers to the study of how actions of governing institutions influence the way a country is governed in the modern age, pertaining in particular to the last two centuries. Social movements have been an increasingly prominent agency of mobilization in modern politics since its initial emergences in the late-18th century, coinciding with the emergence of the modern age − consequently, social movements are a crucial component of, and have had a crucial impact on shaping the modern political landscape. [Very nice introduction - well structured.]

  Social movements have significantly contributed to modern political practice in the following ways: by —

  1. advocating for social change;

  2. mobilizing citizens,

  3. influencing policy-making processes, and

  4. strengthening democratic practices.

  In this essay, I will analyse how social movements have contributed to each of those factors, and subsequently address any limitations that social movements face.

  Firstly, social movements are an effective agent of advocacy for social change, or for the resolution of social issues. Social issues arise when (1) the lives and well-being of members of society (individuals and/or communities) are negatively affected, and (2) a solution is demanded. Social movements unequivocally play a crucial role in raising awareness about social issues, as they arise from changes in political opportunity structures. Such political opportunity structures are comprised of two components, opportunities and threats: ‘opportunities’ arise out of ‘consistent ... sets of clues that encourage people to participate in contentious politics’, including the existence of common and overlapping interests between various stakeholders and actors on a particular social issue, the availability and formation of alliances, and access to external resources; ‘threats’, on the other hand, refer to factors discouraging contention. ‘When threats are experienced and opportunities are perceived [by contentious actors, often ordinary citizens], when the existence of available allies is demonstrated, and when the vulnerability of opponents is exposed’, contentious politics emerges. From this, challengers are able to advance their claims through ‘repertoires of contention’, which are ‘inherited forms of collective action’, or as Charles Tilly aptly puts it, ‘the ways that people act together in pursuit of shared interests’. Taking the forms of voting, petitions, assemblies, strikes, marches, occupation of premises, boycotts, setting fires, violent attacks, etc., these ‘public performances’ are a strong means of bringing significant attention to the social issues that require social change, not only on a citizen-wide level, but also on a state-official level if the disruption brought by such performances is discernible enough. Successful social movements are able to bring about social change and a shift in belief system of citizens, or a shift in the political status quo; replacing ‘a dominant belief system that legitimizes the status quo with an alternative mobilizing belief system that supports collective action for change’. In successful cases, social change takes place when disruption and/or coercive pressures from social movements lead to policy reform or actions taken by authorities. For example, LGBTQ+ rights movements in their advocation for marriage equality have led to policy changes such as the legalization of same-sex marriage in the US.

  Secondly, social movements’ ability to mobilize and engage citizens in political processes has greatly influenced the modern political landscape wherein an upsurging trend of citizen engagement in politics is increasingly evident. The act of mobilizing citizens refers to the act of organizing and encouraging a group of citizens to take collective action in pursuit of particular social objectives − this, as Sidney Tarrow puts, is facilitated by ‘shared understandings, social networks, and connective structures and the use of culturally resonant forms of action’. Social movements cultivate this said ‘shared understanding’ through establishing a sense of ‘movement solidarity’ along its citizens, which is achieved through an optimal intersection of a deliberative ‘framing’ of politics, a clearly defined, crystallized and constructed ‘collective identity’, and ‘emotion work’ wherein emotions are reflected, captured and shaped in provocative and mobilizing ways to its followers. With the establishment of solidarity among citizens, citizens are motivated to engage collective action such as protests, demonstrations, petitions, strikes etc., and such a common solidarity unifies citizens, allowing for strong cohesion and coordination in the creation of public pressure. Technological advancements, specifically the rising prominence of Internet and social media, has played a crucial role in facilitating mobilization efforts. Social media platforms such as Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube and TikTok have provided international platforms for the dissemination of information and resources related to the social issue, for instance the sharing of evidence of social injustices or human rights violations. The disseminated information has the potential to reach a large audience of people all over the world and subsequently facilitate the formation of solidarity across citizens worldwide, as well as the building of social networks between activist individuals and/or organizations. Social movements have been able to establish a strong online identity and presence through, for example, the use of slogans and hashtags (e.g. #BlackLivesMatter, #MeToo, #FridaysForFuture) − citizens can thus be more efficiently mobilized to take action.

  Thirdly, social movements can play an influential role in influencing policy-making processes. Strong social movements can practically function as veto players in how they are able to block or impede political decision-making: by mobilizing public support and acting in public repertoires of contention, both processes as previously outlined, they can engage in disruptive action that disrupts the proposal of policies that are in conflict with their goals or interest. Such disruption may take the form of protests, strikes, boycotts, all of which may potentially halt or delay a change from the status quo if a proposed policy change lies beyond the unanimity core with social movements as a veto player − that is, they can ‘veto’ a policy by causing significant enough institutional disruption to governmental processes, making the political costs of passing the policy change too high to ignore and effectively stopping or delaying it from being passed. For instance, the Tea Party movement of 2009 ‘had become a player in American politics’ by engaging in disruptive movement against government spending, particularly the passing of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), also known as Obamacare. Republican protesters harassed politicians at local town meetings, organized demonstrations outside of Congress, held picnics and rallies to mobilize support at the grassroots level, supported candidates in elections, organized a national convention and set up a political action committee to support candidates, leading to the creation of significant political obstacles and eventually political gridlock. Although it did not necessarily fully repeal the ACA, it was still able to raise political challenges and costs, and was able to shape the political agenda by pushing for spending cuts and fiscal restraints, effectively influencing the implementation of healthcare and fiscal spending policies. [Good.]

  Fourthly, social movements contribute to the strengthening of democratic practices − an increasingly important attribute in a modern political climate where states are becoming more susceptible to democratic backsliding. [Very good.] Not only do social movements occasionally serve as a counterpower to democracy by functioning almost as an additional veto player as previously mentioned, social movements safeguard democracy by ‘checking and balancing’ government decisions, directly involving citizens at the grassroot-level, and often advocating for democratic reform. Democracy in essence is vesting state power in the people, and when people come together they not only are directly involved in politics, but also gain a significant amount of power in political decision-making. Social movements contribute greatly to the vitality and inclusiveness of modern democratic systems: the Civil Rights Movement, including the Montgomery Bus boycotts, sit-ins, freedom rides and March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, facilitated the passing of the landmark legislation − the Civil Rights Act of 1964 − which laid the groundwork for the Voting Rights Act of 1965, powerfully impacted by the three marches at Selma. The Civil Rights Act offered protection of individual rights to citizens, an important democratic attribute, while the Voting Rights Act ensured the representativeness and equality of democratic practices in the United States by combating discrimination and disenfranchisement of minority voters, safeguarding voting rights against voter suppression. Grassroots organizing and citizen participation allows for collective action on the local level to bring about regional, national or even international change, which is crucial to democratic governance as its bottom-up approach ensures representation, enhances democratic legitimacy, and strengthens social cohesion and solidarity. [This is a good paragraph. Good.]

  There are, however, certain criticisms and limitations to social movements and what they can do. A significant limitation of social movements is the fragmentation and polarization of society into parties of radically different interests. This can be effectively seen through the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests: although the protests effectively mobilized ‘liberal shifts in public opinion on racial issues’ − the Floyd protests increased police unfavorability by 0.28 points and perceptions of discrimination against Black Americans by 0.19 points − there still exists an emergence of ‘counterframes about these events focusing on victim resistance to police orders’, including ‘bad-apple’ claims and ‘Blue Lives Matter’ counter-protests. Social movements may only resonate with certain groups, and instead of bringing groups with opposing interests into agreement, it may instead further radicalize them if opposing groups perceive the movement to be a threat to their socioeconomic status or power. Another challenge faced by social movements is the problem of longevity: it is often rather difficult to sustain momentum and achieve long-term impact. [Good.] When introducing the concept of social movements, Tarrow reiterates often in **his definition that it is only by ‘sustained interaction’ with opponents that make contentious actions ‘movements’ − riots and other flashes in the pan are not considered social movements. Attitudes on police unfavorability among White Americans shifted back toward their pre-Floyd baseline means 100 days after the protests. Social movements unable to sustain momentum are insufficient in creating sustainable change for the future, rendering previous promises of change and reform empty and unfulfilled. Another example of unsustained social movement momentum could be seen in the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO)’s liberation movement: this movement initially declared the ‘liberation of women’ as ‘a fundamental necessity for the revolution, a guarantee for its continuity and a precondition for its victory’, acknowledging the grave discrimination women face and dedicatedly committing itself to the liberation of women. Women’s rights prospered in the first three years under Mozambique liberation but the bright prospects of FRELIMO dwindled soon after being under attack by South African movement RENAMO in 1983 and suffering from famine and war. From both these cases, difficulty in maintaining the momentum of social momentum can cause society to regress and thus reverse the positive social changes the movement intended to bring about, or even cause a country’s conditions to deteriorate as the FRELIMO movement showcased. Yet despite these limitations, social movements have still had an indispensable impact on shaping modern politics and advancing social change, cohesion and progress − the landmark influences that social movements have brought to the modern political sphere must not be discounted.

  All in all, social movements significantly impact modern political practice through leveraging contention to advocate for social changes, mobilizing citizens by including them in collective action, protests and demonstrations at grassroots levels and utilizing social media networks to coordinate and facilitate mobilization, influencing policy decisions through disruption and acting as an additional veto player, and finally its role in strengthening democracy by promoting inclusiveness and representation of citizen interests. Social movements are to be an increasingly powerful force in global politics, acting as a primary instrument of mobilization with the power to urge for immediate change in pressing social issues.

  (1929 words)

  [This is very nice, Seraph. You discuss the theory and as you move toward the end you do a better and better job of integrating your examples with the theoretical framework you're building up. Keep in mind that you are building as you move through an essay. Early definitions can be assumed later on, so that you can effectively apply the theory to increasingly complex cases. Think of it as a snowball rolling down a bill building up size and speed as it goes! :)

  This is well-organized and clear. Good job.]

• Revolutions: How and why do revolutions either succeed or fail?

  Political orders and regimes are sometimes transformed comprehensively, for example from a monarchy to a republic, from an authoritarian regime to a democracy, or from a colonial to a post-colonial state. Such transformations of political regimes have been, in history, mainly facilitated by the mechanism of revolutions. A revolution, as Goldstone defines, is ‘the forcible overthrow of a government through mass mobilization (whether military or civilian or both) in the name of social justice, to create new political institutions’. For any form of civil disobedience to be considered a revolution, it must fulfill the four requirements as listed in the definition:

  1. The current or existing government must be (forcibly) overthrown.

  2. This should be done through the mass mobilization of civilians (or the military).

  3. Such disobedience must be done in the name of social justice, i.e. if it is done purely out of e.g. a desire for personal status and power it would not be considered a revolution.

  4. New political institutions are created (and ideally sustained).

  Granted these four conditions, the success of an attempted revolution depends on whether or not, and how well, these four conditions are met. Successful revolutions are able to (entirely) transform a country’s political regime in a progressive way that enhances social change − failed revolutions, on the other hand, are met with either lack of support, repression, and/or inability to establish an alternative, better political system than the one they sought to take down. In this essay, I will first attempt to establish a more comprehensive definition of the success of revolutions. I will then examine what influences the defining factors of a revolution’s success, of which can be split into strong reasons and causes (the ‘why’), and effective actions and processes (the ‘how’).

  Six criteria for success

  In consideration of the definition of a revolution, and examination of past successful revolutions, I find that a successful revolution encompasses six fundamental aspects. A successful revolution should have:

  1. Popular empowerment and participation. Revolutions run on the mechanism of mass mobilization: they mobilize the population by empowering and amplifying their voices, allowing them to participate in decision-making processes and have a voice in shaping the future of their society. The higher the participation − or the more the population is mobilized and involved − the more likely for a revolution to be successful. A revolution should also obviously represent the interests of the population: it advocates for social progress, for which the population is the largest beneficiary of.

  2. Overthrown the existing regime. The very essence of a revolution is its overthrowing of the existing regime as a result of dissatisfactions with the way it is operated. For a revolution to be successful it should have successfully removed the current government from positions of power − whether it be the removal of a dictator, dissolution of a monarchy, independence from colonial rule, or the dismantling of an authoritarian regime.

  3. Established a new political system, or achieved substantial political change. With the removal of a government (that the revolution may render incompetent or inadequate) a new government needs to be established in replacement of the old one, and it should have improved upon the aspects of the old political system that supporters of the revolution may have had complaints or dissatisfactions about. This may come in the form of establishing a new constitutional framework, adoption of democratic governance, recognition of civil liberties etc., all of which would contribute to the achievement of substantial political change.

  4. Improved the socioeconomic conditions for civilians. Prior to revolution, it often occurs that socioeconomic conditions are abysmal or at least suboptimal, in order to have triggered grievances and motivations among civilians for change. Acts of revolution should thus have actually improved the lives of civilians in order to be considered successful, from reducing economic inequalities, to improving living conditions, to addressing social injustices, to promoting equitable resource allocation.

  5. Stability and longevity of its impacts. If a revolution is unable to sustain positive change in the long run, it could very much revert to a pre-revolution state of affairs or worse, perhaps even instigating grievances for a new revolution. A genuinely successful revolution avoids this by establishing continuity plans allowing the new regime to last and prosper past the initial ‘honeymoon stages’ of the revolution’s success.

  6. International recognition and influence. Successful revolutions often gain significant traction in the process of, and after, the revolution. Revolutions may be backed by foreign allies and a good international network − allyships may provide financial and resource support. A successful revolution also tends to be an influential one, laying the groundwork for future revolutions.

  The extent to which a revolution meets these criteria for a successful revolution is, as aforementioned, defined by the strength of its reasons and causes, in addition to the effectiveness of the actions and processes carried out by revolutionaries.

  Why revolutions succeed

  So why do revolutions succeed? Revolutions succeed in part due to several main reasons, including having widespread grievances and motivations, high levels of popular support, external influences in favor of the revolution’s growth, and repression and counter-revolutionary tactics, or rather the lack thereof.

  1. Successful revolutions often emerge from widespread grievances, such as political oppression, economic inequality, social injustice, or systemic corruption. For instance, the French Revolution rose from the post-American War of Independence, late-eighteenth century France, where ‘accumulated war debts and the imminent expiration of wartime tax measures created a fiscal crisis’, ‘a year of famine had spurred riots across the country’ and commoners were still significantly politically and socioeconomically oppressed under the estate system. These grievances, when legitimate, widespread and intense enough, can mobilize a broad base of support and provide the motivation or incentive for revolutionary action.

  2. The level of popular support and participation in a revolution can significantly impact the level of success. When a significant portion of the population actively supports and participates in revolutionary activities, it can weaken the existing power structures and increase the chances of success. Take the Philippines’ “People Power” Movement of the late 20th century: with Ferdinand Marcos’s growing unpopularity as a president following his lavish spending habits amidst rising poverty and a stagnating economy, voter manipulation tactics, and the assassination of opponent Ninoy Aquino, opposition forces against Marcos grew increasingly united. Following Marcos’ scheduling of a new presidential election in 1986 and eventual fraudulent declaration of Marcos as the winner, a massive crowd of two million civilians rallied in Manila to oust Marcos in an act of civil disobedience. Despite Marcos sending a tank battalion to ‘crush the revolt’, the size, organization and discipline of the crowd rendered soldiers unwilling to kill unarmed, peaceful civilians, and eventually they began to join the crowd. High levels of popular support have given significant power to the crowd, and rendered Marcos powerless, successfully ousting Marcos from his position. Conversely, a lack of widespread support may undermine a revolution's prospects. As a result, revolutions often need common, shared motives for action, and a population that is unified, not radicalized, to give rise to high popular support for it.

  3. External influences, including international support or intervention, can also have a significant impact on the outcome of revolutions. Support from other countries or international organizations can provide resources, legitimacy, and protection to revolutionaries. Most successful revolutions have had support from foreign countries: for instance, the American colonies' revolution against British rule received support from France, which provided military aid, supplies, and naval assistance to the revolutionaries − external support thus played a crucial role in the eventual victory of the American colonies and the establishment of the United States. Conversely, foreign intervention or opposition can pose significant challenges and increase the chances of failure. For instance, the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s faced opposition from the United States. The U.S. government imposed an economic embargo on Cuba, severing diplomatic relations and implementing trade restrictions that lasted for decades. While it ultimately still succeeded in implementing changes in Cuban society, it caused deterioration and strain in the Cuban-US relationship which had spillover effects of economic hardships as a result of the economic sanctions.

  4. Finally, the responses of existing power structures to the revolutionary movement greatly influence the outcome, as repressive measures, such as violence, censorship, or co-optation, can undermine the revolution and discourage popular support. ‘Where a loyal and determined military supports a financially strong and independent government, nonviolent resistance will usually fail, succumbing to harsh repression’; Goldstone cites the attempted “Green Revolution” in Iran in 2009, the pro-democracy revolt in Burma in 1988, and the Tiananmen Square revolt in China in 1989’ as various examples of revolutions unable to overcome the repression of existing power structures. The Green Revolution, an attempted revolution following an alleged fraudulent election result, failed following the Iranian government’s brutal crackdown on protestors deploying security forces and paramilitary groups to suppress demonstrators. Likewise, protestors of the pro-democracy revolt in Burma and Tiananmen Square revolt in China faced similar outcomes: military was deployed to suppress protestors, resulting in tightening of political control and solidification of the existing regime’s authority over its citizens. Thus, a revolution can only succeed in absence of a strong government with a fiercely loyal military, and only very rarely, if ever, do revolutions succeed in avoiding or responding to repressive military crackdowns like the ones mentioned.

  How revolutions succeed

  In addition to the strength of a revolution’s motivating reasons and causes, a successful revolution’s procedures should be smooth-running and effective. How a revolution succeeds is influenced by the tactics and strategies employed, leadership and organization, timing and opportunities, as well as coherence and unity.

  1. The effectiveness of tactics and strategies employed by revolutionaries can determine success or failure. Revolutionaries may employ a variety of tactics, including but not limited to urban protests, workers’ strikes, peasant uprisings, an elite challenge to the regime, or guerrilla attacks (or increasingly with social media campaigns). The combination of the appropriate strategies, in addition to the ability to adapt strategies to changing circumstances is crucial to defining the success of revolutions. Mass mobilization strategies such as large-scale protests, demonstrations, and strikes, as well as other nonviolent civil disobedience forms, such as boycotts, sit-ins and refusal of compliance with oppressive laws, can disrupt the normal functioning of a regime and put pressure on its leadership, demonstrating civilians’ discontentment and weakening the regime’s legitimacy. Tactics such as information warfare are particularly useful in disseminating and exposing information about a regime’s oppressiveness to garner international support and further weaken a regime’s legitimacy in the digital age. Fragmentation of security forces can crucially weaken a regime as well: winning over parts of the military can lead to internal conflicts that undermine a regime’s ability to maintain control and suppress opposition, as in the aforementioned Philippines’ “People Power” movement rallies.

  2. Timing and opportunities play a vital role in revolutions. Goldstone’s discussion of the concept of ‘stable equilibrium’ may help us understand the role of timing and opportunities in influencing revolutions. He posits that a revolution’s ‘golden timing’, so to speak, is when a country is at ‘unstable equilibrium’ condition − where a small disturbance leads to an ever larger departure from the prior condition. A poor timing for a revolution would be when the country is at a stable equilibrium condition, one in which the response to a moderate disturbance is a return to the original condition. This can be analogized to a ball sitting at the bottom of a large depression or valley − a nudge of the ball towards any direction would lead to the ball reverting back to its original condition at the pit of the valley. Goldstone analyzes five favorable conditions for an unstable equilibrium: (1) national economic or political strains, (2) growing alienation and opposition among the elites, (3) increasingly widespread popular anger at injustice, (4) presence of an ideology that presents a persuasive shared narrative of resistance, and (5) favorable international relations. When these conditions coincide, a ‘golden timing’ for revolution is presented. Thus, favorable historical circumstances, such as economic crises, political instability, or external conflicts, can create opportunities for revolutionary movements to gain momentum and challenge the existing order.

  3. Effective leadership and organizational structures are crucial for revolutionaries to coordinate actions, maintain discipline, and articulate a clear vision for change. Strong leaders who can inspire and unite diverse factions within the revolutionary movement are often key to success. Leaders can be categorized into visionary and organizational leaders: visionary leaders are ‘prolific writers, often great speechmakers, [who] articulate the faults of the old society and make a powerful case for social change’, including Thomas Jefferson, Robespierre, Francisco Madero, Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh, Mahatma Gandhi, Václav Havel, and Ayatollah Khomeini; while organizational leaders, on the other hand, are ‘great organizers and strategists, [who figure] out how to realize the ideas of visionary leaders, to make sure that the revolution can defeat its enemies and meet its economic and political goals’, including George Washington, Napoleon, Venustiano Carranza, Leon Trotsky, Zhou Enlai, Raoul Castro, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Lech Wałęsa. A good revolution needs both visionary and organizational leaders: ‘without visionary leaders to inspire and unite the opposition, the existing regime can usually isolate and defeat its fragmented opponents. Without organizational leaders, the revolutionary forces will easily be defeated by their opponents, either internal or external, as the new revolutionary regime fails because of ineffective policies and a lack of resources’.

  4. The ability to maintain a unified front and overcome internal differences is crucial for success. Internal divisions, factionalism, or infighting among revolutionaries can weaken collective efforts and make a revolution vulnerable to repression. Take the French Revolution, for instance: despite its initial success in abolishing feudalism and the monarchy, introducing a constitutional framework, producing the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and election of the Legislative Assembly and National Convention, this was quickly followed by the radical phase in which the Jacobins, led by Maximilien Robespierre, overtook France in the Reign of Terror. The Jacobins were a radical political club that advocated for a centralized republic and pursued extremist revolutionary measures, infamously including the guillotined execution of any accused enemies or opposition to the revolution. The extremist, radical attitudes of the Jacobins created a divide between the Jacobins and the Girondins, a more moderate faction that favored a decentralized republic and sought to limit the power of the Paris-based Jacobins. Escalation in conflict and infighting between the two factions contributed to the fall of the Jacobins following the Thermidorian Reaction of 1794, resulting in failure of the Jacobin revolution. This ultimately proves that maintaining coherence and unity within parties, and between civilians of a country, is crucial to a revolution’s success, and failure to do so will result in an outcome of downfall like that of the Jacobins.

  Conclusion

  All in all, revolutions are successful if and only if they are able to overthrow the government through mass mobilization mechanisms to create new political institutions in the name of social justice. Successful revolutions are characterized by popular empowerment and participation, overthrowing of the existing regime, establishment of new political systems or political change, improvement of socioeconomic conditions, stability and longevity, and widespread international recognition and influence. Revolutions succeed because of widespread grievances and motivations, high levels of popular support, strong external support networks, and lack of counter-revolutionary repression; they achieve this success through employing effective strategies and tactics, exploiting the ideal timing and opportunity of an ‘unstable equilibrium’, effective leadership combining visionary and organizational leaders, and maintaining cohesion and unity by avoiding factionalism and infighting. Revolutions have facilitated the many instances of regime change in countries’ histories, and is likely to continue doing so; thus it is important for us to comprehend the factors that make or break a revolution, so that when a regime change is potentially necessary or uprising, we can have a firmer, more tangible grasp on the processes and outcomes involved.

• Populism: ‘The similarities between different strands of populism outweigh the differences.’ Discuss.

  No, the similarities between different strands of populism do not outweigh the differences. Populism is a widely discussed concept in modern politics: simply defined as ‘a member of a political party claiming to represent the common people’, populism has been seen at both ends of the political spectrum, from Bernie Sanders to Donald Trump to the Brexiteers, or from the left-wing Greek Syriza (Coalition of the Radical Left) to the right-wing Austrian FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria). Populism has also been classified by some as a phenomenon only relevant in democracies, yet there are populism appearing in authoritarian regimes as well. It then becomes a widely discussed question whether populism, the ‘anti-pluralist, anti-elitist’ concept, becomes even relevant enough to withstand the varying differences in its ideologies, regimes etc. among different strands. I will argue that the similarities between these different strands do not outweigh the differences, but nevertheless do not erase the value of populism as a political concept.

  Firstly, I will outline the core similarities underpinning all the different branches of populism. The concept of populism combines anti-elitism: a criticism of the elites as corrupt and portrayal of them as antagonists against the people; and anti-pluralism: the rejection of pluralistic institutions, parties or agencies to represent the people, claiming that their party and their party only represents the will of 100% of the people. Therefore, all populist claims are anti-elitist and anti-pluralist by definition. There is a clear critique of establishment and emphasis on the (homogeneous) community of ‘common people’ it represents. That is, however, as far as the resemblance lies between different variations of populism.

  Political scholars have attempted to make distinctions between different strands of populism: Peters (et al.)’s typology of populism is a four-fold typology distinguishing between different regime types, as well as locus of populist politics. I adopt Peters’ typology and decide that different types of regimes and different loci of political activity are significant, but that the main distinction lies within the nature of the populist narrative, which arguably overrides the anti-pluralist, anti-elitist populist similarity.

  The first core distinction is the former distinction made in Peters’ typology: regime type. This distinction demonstrates that populism can exist in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. Despite common claims that populism is ‘democratic in nature, as it gives a voice to the people and heavily follows the idea of majoritarian rule’, populism can also be present in authoritarian regimes, as authoritarian leaders gain power through elections or utilize populist appeals to maintain their place in office. This renders two completely different functions of populism: in democratic regimes, populism serves as a sign of democratic backsliding as it contradicts the liberal democratic value of protecting minorities by excluding certain demographics or non-supporters from their rhetoric while publicly acting under the clean conscience of ‘appealing to the common people’ and following ostentatiously democratic practices; whereas in authoritarian regimes, populism acts as a way to maintain the regime’s legitimacy, whether to assess public sentiment about programmes or gather information or just as a form of window-dressing.

  The second distinction is the latter distinction in the typology: locus of political activity. This distinguishes between strands of populism where those making populist claims are in fact common people, i.e. possess a mass/participatory locus, or whether the populists are elites themselves such as government officials, bureaucrats, businessmen, the financially well-off, etc., i.e. an elite locus. The second type is extremely paradoxical (yet also especially common in modern populism): anti-elite sentiments are a core constituent of populist narratives, yet it would seem to have to be the case that they are critiquing themselves if this were true. Therefore it is often the case in this type of populism that elites frame some other party as the ‘corrupt elite’, such as the media, political opponents of their political party, or educated ‘elites’ criticizing their campaign, while framing themselves as part of the ‘virtuous people’ they claim to represent (this is commonly seen as ‘electoral populism’ in democracies, the most common conception of populism; or ‘electoral authoritarianism’ as in authoritarian regimes). Whereas in the first type, with a mass/participatory locus, the public is more directly involved, and such a type of populism generally involves more real transfer of political power to the average citizen and perhaps a more genuine adherence to the populist ‘claim of representing the people’, such as in direct democracy or even consultative authoritarianism. This type of distinction differentiates between populist politics that truly involve the public vs. political elites utilizing populist rhetoric for their own purposes.

  Arguably the most important distinction to make between different strands of populism that greatly outweighs any tying similarity is that of the nature of the populist claims and rhetorics: I call the two differentiated types ‘benign’ and ‘malignant’ populism. This is what draws a line between Bernie Sanders-style populism and that of Trump’s. ‘Benign’ populism denotes populism that is harmless and does not employ dangerous exclusionary narratives. This type of populism may even be progressive and inclusionary in nature, and its anti-elitist component may take the form of critique against corporate power, elite corruption, socioeconomic inequality etc.; consequently, the nature of their policy actions are equally progressive, for example Sanders’ advocates for electoral reforms, progressive taxation, public control of industries, government investment, and affordable education, or Latin American populism which also intends to include as much of society as possible as part of the people, and to generate more inclusionary policies. Sanders-type benign populism tends to align with the roots of the original Populist movement in the 1890s, where farmers, subsistence workers etc. congregated to form the People’s Party, expressing anger at elites such as politicians and business-owners and advocating for economic justice reform. ‘Malignant’ populism, on the other hand, can be dangerous: it takes the ostentatious name of representing the ‘common man’ but twists it to fit a particular exclusionary, reactionary agenda. Take Trump’s version of populism, for instance: Trump advocates for tax cuts, anti-immigration reform, white protectionist measures, which implicitly redefines the ‘common man’ as the white upper-middle-class conservative American. This notion of the ‘common man’ clearly does not include the poor, people of color, or any immigrant for that matter. This type of populism can be dangerous as it can erode democratic institutions, allow authoritarian populists a claim to legitimacy, exclude entire minority demographics and ultimately hardly live up to their claim to ‘representing the people’.

  Populism that falls into either of these two types of populism are too distinctly different from the other: it seems unfair to lump benign populism and malignant populism under the same label of ‘populist’ despite both fitting its definition. Populism has ‘gone sour’ over the last few decades yet we have willingly accepted the ‘gone sour’ version of populism as the mainstream conception of populism as it has become such a prominent tactic in modern politics, so far as to reject the original notion of populism as a genuine claim to representing the common man. I argue that those who aim to genuinely represent concerns of the common man in an inclusive, progressive way should be distinguished and separated from those who claim to represent the same concerns but push for exclusionary policies.

  While this is the case, I do believe there is still value in lumping all strands together under the collective umbrella term of 'populism'. The appeal to the 'common man' and anti-elitist sentiments demonstrate how voters are mobilized by an appeal to the people and their fears, anxieties, and dreams of a better world. So despite populism varying in a way that significantly outweighs the way in which it is similar, its common ground is still worthy of political analysis.

Trinity 2024

• Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: What is the difference between a presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary system, and does it matter for the real-world operation of a political system?

  Among democracies, there exists variations in the constitutional structure of political systems. The political system of democracies can be split into three types: presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems, each of which differ in how the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government are related to each other as constitutionally defined. The ways in which these three branches interact impact the real-world operation of a political system, as it impacts the power of each branch of government in political decision-making. I argue that the main difference between the three forms of government is variations in executive power and accountability, and that these variations impact various aspects of real-world political operations including political stability, power separation and concentration, gridlock potential, etc. I will first outline each of the forms of government: presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential forms of government. I will then identify the core differences between the three systems, and finally, discuss its implications on their real-world operation and governance.

  In presidential systems, a president serves as both the head of state and head of government. The president is popularly directly elected by the electorate for a fixed term, as defined by the constitution (usually a term of four to six years). The president also holds significant executive powers, including the ability to make policy decisions, execute laws and represent the country domestically and internationally. The clear separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government is a defining feature of presidential systems: the executive branch is not accountable to the legislature and operates independently from other branches of government. While presidential systems offer executive independence, executive power is not unrestrained: a system of checks and balances is often in place to prevent executive abuse of authority.

  In parliamentary systems, the executive branch, led by a prime minister, is accountable to the legislature (parliament). The head of government is typically the prime minister, who is usually either the leader of the political party or coalition with a majority of seats in parliament, or has been able to form a stable government through alliances with other parties. The key element of parliamentary systems is that the head of government is accountable to the legislature through a vote of no confidence: the parliament has the power to dismiss the prime minister and the executive cabinet if a vote of no confidence is passed, which indicates the parliament has lost confidence in the government and leads to the prime minister’s resignation and the formation of a new government. While the prime minister is capable of dissolving the legislature at their own discretion, the no-confidence vote greatly increases executive accountability and thus interconnection or dependence of the executive and legislative branches.

  Semi-presidential systems combine the two above forms of government: they contain a head of state, usually a president who is directly elected, as well as a head of government, usually a prime minister accountable to the legislature. Semi-presidential systems have dual executives: both the president and prime minister hold executive powers, although the nature and extent of each executive’s powers may vary. The president, as head of state, is responsible for foreign policy and national security matters, as well as the overall direction of government; whereas the prime minister, as the head of government, is more responsible for day-to-day governance, policy implementation, and legislative affairs. There are two types of semi-presidential systems: premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems. In a premier-presidential system, the government is responsible to the legislature but not the president; whereas in a president-parliamentary system, the government is responsible to the legislature and the president.

  There are various ways to classify democratic systems into the three systems. Clark et al. proposes two criteria for distinguishing between the three systems: (1) whether the government is responsible to the elected legislature, and (2) whether the head of state is popularly elected for a fixed term in office. A presidential system is a democratic system where the government is not responsible to the elected legislature. A semi-presidential system is one where the government is responsible to the elected legislature and a head of state is popularly elected for a fixed term in office. A parliamentary system is one where the government is responsible to the legislature but the head of state is not popularly elected for a fixed term in office, as the figure below illustrates.

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  In addition to Clark’s distinctions, separation of powers is significantly clearer in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems, whereas the legislature and executive branches are closely interdependent in parliaments; semi-presidential systems lie somewhere in the middle, as one executive is independent while the other is accountable to the legislature. The role of the executive also varies with the two systems: presidents are both the head of state and head of government, whereas in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, the prime minister takes on the head-of-government role while the head-of-state role is taken by a monarch or president.

  We may narrow all these various differences down to two core differences: the loci of executive accountability and extent of executive power. In presidential democracies, the locus of executive accountability lies in the electorate as an executive (the president) derives its legitimacy from the people and therefore has a responsibility to represent and serve the interests of the electorate. In parliamentary democracies, the locus of executive accountability lies in the legislature as the the executive (the prime minister) is selected by the legislature and is subject to a legislative vote of no confidence that could force them into resignation. The president generally has more executive power while the prime minister’s powers are generally weaker. The dual-executive aspect of semi-presidential systems indicates that the loci of executive accountability is a hybrid of the two − sometimes (in president-parliamentary systems) the parliamentary executive is accountable to the president. In terms of extent of executive power, president has most executive power (is formateur of government and can even legislate by decree), whereas for parliaments not so much.

  This variation in democracies has its implications on real-world operation and governance. It has the potential to influence political stability and decision-making efficiency. The different systems influence the strength of checks and balances upon the executive: a strong system of checks can prevent backsliding, autocracy or an excess concentration of power in executives/legislatures and takeover of other governmental branches, thus contributing to higher political stability. Presidential systems may concentrate significant power in the hands of one individual, while parliamentary systems may be susceptible to party dominance, potentially leading to a lack of effective opposition and limited representation. The variations also impact changes in government and cabinet durability, which also contribute to political stability − fixed presidential terms may face less executive stability challenges than parliamentary executives.

  In terms of decision-making efficiency, gridlock may be more likely in presidential systems as the president works independent of legislature while parliamentary systems offer higher potential for consensus-building with the legislature working hand-in-hand with executives. Semi-presidential systems attempt to strike a balance between presidential and parliamentary elements, combining features of both systems and providing flexibility, balance of powers, and potential for consensus-building; yet they can also be prone to conflicts, power struggles, and potential instability due to the dual executive structure.

  However, the political or economic outcomes of all three systems may end up rather similar. There is not much empirical evidence suggesting better economic development, political stability or social progress among parliamentary or presidential systems.

  All in all, the three types of government differ mainly in whether the executive’s relationship with the legislature is dependent or independent, impacting the loci and extent of executive accountability and power. This in turn may influence political stability and decision-making efficiency in real-world governance, yet may ultimately create similar outcomes economically and politically.

• Party systems: What are the sociological and institutional determinants of party systems? What are the major weaknesses of these explanations?

  Political parties are “a group of officials or would be officials who are linked with a sizable group of citizens into an organization; a chief object of this organization is to ensure that its officials attain power or are maintained in power” (Shively 2001, 234). Parties aggregate elite and mass interests through legislatures and elections respectively, allowing political actors a location on the political landscape on which they can align themselves (Campbell et al. 1986, 100). With the aggregation of interests a sort of link is (ideally) created between elites and masses (Sartori 1976) in which elites and masses are connected ideologically and structurally.

  Parties interact with one another, giving rise to party systems. A party system is “a system of interaction resulting from inter-party competition. That is, the system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function of the other parties and reacts competitively or otherwise, to the other parties” (Sartori 1976, 44) − in other words, parties interact competitively and in a mutually dependent manner hence making up party system dynamics. Party systems differ in various ways, including but not limited to origin, legal framework, resources, organization, ideology and competition. Various factors give rise to the differences in party systems − which could be categorized into sociological and institutional explanations.

  The main sociological approach to explaining party systems’ rise and variation is the ‘social cleavages’ explanation, put forth by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Social cleavages are historically determined social or cultural lines dividing citizens within a society into groups with differing political interests, resulting in political conflict among these groups.

  Lipset and Rokkan identify four major classifications of cleavages (1967, 47). The first type, the ‘center-periphery’ cleavage, describes a division or disparity between a dominant central region or group and marginalized peripheral regions or groups within a country, and gives rise to ethno-regionalist party divisions. Often the central or dominant region has access to more political power, wealth, social services such as healthcare or education, and is the country’s ‘dominant culture’, imposing dominant cultural norms on the periphery. This may perhaps instigate peripheral demands for decentralization or greater regional autonomy. As a result, ethno-regionalist parties arise from the center-periphery cleavage, dividing the dominant ethnicity/region from the marginalized. The second type, the ‘state-church’ cleavage, describes the divide between religious and secular voters, showing how religion can be a source of party alignment. The first two types rose in prominence in pre-19th century European societies and mark earlier forms of social cleavages forming parties in older party systems. The third and fourth types rose in prominence following the Industrial Revolution: the third type, the ‘land-industry’ cleavage, created agrarian and peasant parties, while the fourth type,  the ‘owner-worker’ cleavage, gave rise to socialist or communist parties.

  Yet the mere existence of cleavages alone do not give rise to parties: it is the interaction of such cleavages that reinforce party division and determine the number of parties. Clark et al. (2013, 636) make the distinction between cross-cutting cleavages and reinforcing cleavages: ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ occur when different social divisions or identities do not align neatly with one another, while ‘reinforcing cleavages’ occur when a country has reinforcing or neatly aligning attributes. See Table 14.7 and 14.8: in table 14.7, there is no clear alignment of language with geographic location and a four-way identity category is hence created; whereas in table 14.8, southerners are aligned with French speakers while northerners are aligned with Dutch speakers, giving rise to a mere two-way identity category: ‘French-speaking Southerners’ and ‘Dutch-speaking Northerners’. Therefore, the number of parties depend on how cleavages interact.

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  After developing the notion of social cleavages, Lipset and Rokkan advance the sociological approach to party systems by putting forth the ‘Freezing Hypothesis’, which posits that party systems have become ‘frozen’ with universal suffrage by the 1920s. Cleavages evolved into parties in order to incorporate new groups (particularly marginalized groups) into politics, but with universal suffrage in place no further electoral bases needed to be mobilized. European party systems, according to the Freezing Hypothesis, have stabilized by this point and, instead of activation and mobilization of cleavages into new parties, party systems merely change by slight evolutions of existing parties.

  There are various challenges to the Freezing Hypothesis, most of which attempt to prove that new cleavages have emerged since the 1920s. Kitschelt (1988) puts forth that new political parties − ‘left-libertarian parties’ as Kitschelt puts it − which are concerned with different left-wing issues than the ‘old left’, such as environment and migration. Inglehart (1977) posits this is triggered by a shift from a previously ‘materialist’ to a ‘post-materialist cleavage’ following the decline of the Industrial Revolution. On the right-wing side, the 1980s-90s have seen the rise of populist radical right-wing parties in certain parts of Europe (Kitschelt, 1996), especially with globalization causing a wave of immigration and Euroscepticism following the integration of European countries into the EU. Yet despite the challenges to the Freezing Hypothesis, it can still be argued that such challenges have not truly changed European party systems, as left-libertarian parties ‘managed to poll only about 5 percent of the vote on average during the 1990s in Western Europe’, extreme right-wing populists around the same rate (Mair 1997).

  The institutional approach to political parties looks at how political institutions (electoral systems in particular) shape party system dynamics. Duverger (1964) recognized that electoral systems, such as plurality or proportional representation (PR), can shape the effective number and nature of electoral and legislative parties. He splits the impacts affecting this outcome into two effects: the ‘mechanical effect’ and ‘strategic effect’. The mechanical effect refers to the impact of the electoral system's rules and mechanics on the effective number of parties. It focuses on how the electoral system converts votes into seats and affects party representation in the legislature (e.g. a PR system tends to have a lower mechanical effect because it allocates seats proportionally to parties based on vote shares, allowing smaller parties to win representation; while a plurality/single-member district plurality (SMDP) system tends to have a higher mechanical effect as it favors larger parties and may result in a smaller number of parties winning seats.) The strategic effect refers to the strategic behavior of political actors, including voters and parties, in response to the electoral system: voters will act rationally to avoid ‘wasting’ votes (e.g. by voting for the next-best-alternative or to keep the least preferred party out), while rational elites are unlikely to invest in new parties as this might not garner votes.

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  He put forth a law and a hypothesis: ‘Duverger’s law’ posits that single-member district plurality systems will give rise to two-party systems, while ‘Duverger’s hypothesis’ posits that proportional representation electoral rules will encourage multi-party systems.

  In Duverger’s law, SMDP systems (i.e. FPTP-systems) allow the candidate who receives the most votes in each district to win the seat regardless of whether they have an absolute majority. This lends to two-party systems as voters are aware that only one candidate can win in each district and so will perceive voting for smaller parties as futile, concentrating support on the two major parties. On the other hand, in Duverger’s hypothesis, PR systems provide smaller parties with a better chance of representation even without widespread support. This encourages the proliferation of multiple parties, as each party has a realistic chance of winning seats. PR systems tend to accommodate a more diverse range of political parties and allow for greater representation of smaller ideological or interest-based parties. Duverger’s view, however, still imperfectly captures party systems. First it relies on the assumption of the ‘rational, strategic voter’. Secondly Duverger’s view is highly voter-oriented and pays less attention to the strategic decisions made by political elites and parties.

  All in all, sociological approaches to explaining party systems, taken by Lipset and Rokkan, look at various social cleavages causing divisions into parties, which, according to their theory, have ‘frozen’ in place since the 1920s due to universal suffrage. The major weakness of this approach is that it could be potentially challenged by the rise of post-materialist left-libertarian parties and Eurosceptic populist right-wing parties in the late 20th century leading to the erosion of traditional social cleavages and the emergence of new fault lines − one may argue that they are yet to take on mainstream significance, although the freezing hypothesis still fails to explain their rise. On the other hand, institutional approaches, taken by Duverger, explains that SMDP systems give rise to two-party systems while PR systems give rise to multi-party systems; this, however, assumes voter rationality and is overly voter-oriented. A shared major weakness of both parties is the lack of holism if looked at individually: a combination of sociological and institutional explanations (e.g. in Table 14.16) may attempt to reconcile this deficiency in both parties.

• Parties and Voters: Do voters still exhibit stable links to established parties in advanced democracies, and if not why not?

  Links to established parties in advanced democracies has decreased in stability in recent decades. While it cannot be resolutely said that voters no longer exhibit any stable link to established parties, the stability of voters’ links with established parties has significantly declined over time. This decline in stable links over time is known as dealignment, which is a trend or process whereby a large portion of the electorate ceases to affiliate or align themselves with any certain political party. Party dealignment has become a particularly prominent trend in the electorate since the 1980s and has persisted into the 21st century. While there are trends of realignment in the 21st century contributing to potentially re-stabilizing voter links, the trend of dealignment seems to be overarching.

  Firstly, the decline in stable links to established parties can be attributed to the decline in cleavage politics, beginning in the 1980s. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) ‘based party choice squarely on the structuring effects of social cleavages’ (Franklin 2009, pp.1), and empirical links between social cleavages and party alignments were near-incontestable, at the same time where changes in the demographic makeup of the electorate on each side of the social cleavages had occurred so incrementally to cause any new cleavages to arise, giving rise to their ‘freezing hypothesis’, in which political parties and their electorate demographics have ‘frozen’ and stabilized in the post-war, post-universal suffrage period. However, party support changed in the 1970s-80s, deviating from the expectations set forth by Lipset and Rokkan’s hypothesis. For instance, new parties, such as ‘left-libertarian parties’ (Kitschelt 1988) and even populist right-wing parties, are gaining electoral traction following a shift to the ‘post-materialist’ age (Inglehart 1977), with issues such as environment and migration moving to the forefront of political discourse. This, accompanied with the increased volatility of electorate voting patterns, was not necessarily accompanied by the formation of new social cleavages. Formerly, cleavage politics explained party alignment and identification: voters are committed and thus strongly linked to their parties due to shared political interests and/or shared sociocultural characteristics — the party acts as an agent of representation for voters and so unyielding commitment to the party seems only reasonable and natural. Yet now that social cleavages are no longer as politically definitive as before due to the rise of new modern issues, cleavage politics are not so relevant to establishing stable links between parties and voters, contributing to dealignment in modern advanced democracies.

  Secondly, a shift from party-centric to candidate-centric politics significantly weakened voter links to established parties. This is catalyzed by an erosion in the value of political parties: parties used to function as an agent of mobilization, mobilizing people to go to the polls, yet in 17 of 19 advanced industrial democracies investigated by Dalton and Wattenberg (2002), turnout figures in the 1990s have declined from the 1950s indicating parties are ‘no longer functioning as effectively as they once did’ (pp.263) which Wattenberg views as an indicator of the ‘broad-based weakening of party systems’ (pp.264). Wattenberg further analogizes the decline of value of what political parties have to offer to a business product in the marketplace — a decline in sales would indicate that customers no longer find use for the merchandise, just as a decline in party alignment and identification indicates a decline in use for political parties. Additionally, the erosion in partisan loyalties and confidence in political parties as a political institution evidently reduces the value of parties: in the 1995–98 World Values Survey, the confidence level in parties as a political institution ‘came in a disappointing last’ of all institutions, at merely 22% of respondents across 8 OECD nations (pp.264). With the weakening of the value of parties as institutions, the shift to candidate-centric politics comes naturally. First, parties’ issue programs have become more flexible. Secondly, parties’ election profiles are nevertheless becoming more candidate-centered, and with that, ‘personalistic campaigns diminish the heuristic value of partisan cues for even those who continue to label themselves as identifying with a particular party’ (pp.264).

  Thirdly, generational shifts and the rise in issue-voting greatly contributed to the dealignment of modern voters with established parties. Increased accessibility of education raised education levels among younger generations, leading younger voters to think more critically about political issues rather than blindly follow an established party irrespective of its performance or policy positions — ‘the decrease in partisanship generally is greater among the young, the better educated, and the politically sophisticated’ (Dalton 2002, pp.263). Dalton notes that these ‘new non-partisans’ remain interested in the political process but ‘are more likely to think of democratic politics in apartisan or even anti‐partisan terms’. They may be more open to alternative political options or consider themselves independent of any particular party. Dalton ‘links these dealignment trends to processes of modernization and cognitive mobilization’. In addition to politically cognitive shifts in new generations, the complexity and polarization of political issues themselves have given rise to the phenomenon of ‘issue-voting’, which has taken prominence over or replaced ‘party-voting’. Parties often have to take positions on a wide range of issues, and voters may not agree with all of them. In addition, increased political polarization has made it harder for parties to maintain broad appeal, as voters may feel that neither major party fully represents their views. Additionally, with the rise of the internet, Farrell and Webb argue that ‘citizens will take advantage of this informational resource and will become better informed about the issues that concern them’, correcting any asymmetric information issues between voters and parties. Dalton and Wattenberg remain ‘skeptical about claims that the internet will create a democratic utopia’ — such skepticisms perhaps accredited to the polarization and divisiveness on the internet, from partisan news outlets to social media; yet the conclusion remains that widespread access to a vast array of information allows people the capacity to make more informed decisions and thus facilitate the shift from party-voting to issue-voting, eroding stable links to parties.

  However, trends of realignment in the 21st century have been observed, unaccounted for by Dalton and other late 20th-century framework studies. Such trends may be explained by changing voter coalitions and changing issue positions of parties. Firstly, voter coalitions have shifted in recent decades such that certain demographic groups aligning more strongly with different parties. For instance, left-wing or progressive-leaning parties have been re-aligned with younger, educated voters, urban dwellers and ethnic minorities/immigrants, while conservative parties are usually aligned with rural-dwelling, working-class, older, and (in white-dominant nations) white voters. Secondly, parties themselves have shifted policy positions towards more streamlined, focused courses of action on various issues which aligns with the party’s new identity: for instance, the Democratic Party’s shift towards more progressive positions on issues such as pro-healthcare reform, climate change mitigation, and anti-racism measures, and the Republican Party’s shift towards conservative positions such as anti-immigration and trade-protectionist stances.

  All in all, party dealignment seems to be the main trend in the current landscape of voting in advanced industrial democracies, as a consequence of the decline in cleavage politics, shifts to candidate-centric politics and shifts to a generation that prioritizes issue-voting. Albeit signs of realignment in the 21st century has surfaced which perhaps re-stabilizes voter links to established parties, the modern issue-voter generation is less likely to be bounded by party alignments in making electoral decisions. Ultimately, modern voters do not exhibit very stable links to established parties in advanced democracies in comparison to previous generations, but it is not to say that no such linkages exist anymore.