Q-Step Essay: Does consensus democracy improve the quality of government?
Outline
Introduction
Definitions
Consensus democracy
Quality of government (QOG)
Argument
Empirical analysis
Participation
Rule of law
Transparency
Responsiveness
Consensus-oriented
Equity and inclusiveness
Effectiveness and efficiency
Accountability
Summary
Conclusion
1. Introduction
The ‘literal meaning of democracy — government by the people — is probably also the most basic and most widely used definition’ of democracy (Lijphart, 1984). The aim of governance is to act as a delegated collective agent representing the people’s interests and making decisions on behalf of their best interests. Democratic systems are thus often preferred systems of governance as they ensure people have a say in decision-making. Democratic governments often achieve ‘government by the people’ by holding regular elections accounting for public opinion, usually in the form of polling wherein the polling option with most votes wins. This is understood as a Westminster or majoritarian interpretation of democracy: ‘government by the majority of the people’, which arises as it is impossible to reconcile the preferences of all individuals with a singular policy decision. However, majoritarian democracy can lead to a deviation from the baseline democratic principle of ‘government by the people’, as it ultimately neglects minority opinion. Consensus democracy, which involves consensus decision-making and the adoption of a supermajority, is often seen as an ‘improved’ model of democratic governance upon the majoritarian model, as it is thought to and designed to protect the governance process from ‘tyranny of the majority’. That being said, consensus democracy might potentially run the risk of inefficiency due to increased difficulty of reaching an agreement. In addition, quality of governance is a multifaceted issue that extends beyond adopting a consensus model. This study aims to empirically examine the effects of consensus democracy on governance quality. I will argue that adopting a consensus model of democracy may improve quality of government (QOG), although exceptions to the rule show that consensus models are neither necessary nor sufficient for high QOG.
2. Definitions
2.1 Consensus democracy
Consensus democracy is ‘a democratic regime that emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of being satisfied with a bare majority’ (Lijphart, 2012, pp.32). Consensus democracy, defined by Lijphart (2012), involves the following criteria:
Executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets: Executive power is concentrated in broad multi-party coalitions instead of a single-party minimal-winning coalition (MWC), making it harder for a single party to control a parliamentary majority.
Executive-legislative balance of power: Balance of power prevents executive dominance over the legislature and stops one branch of government from taking control over the others.
Multi-party system: A multi-party system accommodates a wider variety of choices between representatives and the different interests and values they represent, offering a more diverse voter choice than a dichotomous two-party system, or even a single-party system.
Proportional representation: Proportional representation (PR) is a voting system in which the share of seats won by a party to match the share of votes received. This is preferable to ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP) systems, where the candidate with the most votes wins, even if they receive less than 50% of the votes overall − PR counteracts the potential electoral disproportionality brought by FPTP.
Interest group corporatism: A coordinated, compromise-oriented system of interest groups which involves state incorporation of them into the process of policy formation is advantageous over pluralism, which promotes competition among autonomous, atomic non-state groups which compete for the chance to influence government decision-making.
Federal and decentralized government: A federal government allows decentralization of power, while in a unitary government, power is concentrated in the central government.
Strong bicameralism: A bicameral legislature with two "equally strong but differently constituted houses" in place safeguards a unicameral legislature from taking complete control.
Constitutional rigidity: A rigid, supermajority-amended constitution is harder to override than a flexible, easily-amendable constitution (or no constitution at all), thus providing a stronger safeguard for constitutional bills of rights, which serve to protect minorities, against majoritarian rule.
Judicial review: The availability of judicial review by an independent court acts as an additional check-and-balance, which is a stronger safeguard of consensus democracy against legislative dominance than if legislatures determine constitutionality of their own legislation (i.e. legislative-supremacy constitution).
Central bank independence: Central bank independence prevents government control of the central bank. Monetary decisions are thus not tainted by political motives.
The first five conditions entail the ‘executive-parties’ dimension of consensus democracy (concerning the ease of a single party or governmental branch to dominate government and the decision-making process), while the latter five entail the ‘federal-unitary’ dimension of consensus democracy (concerning the ease of policy change as a party takes control, the centralization or decentralization of power, and existence of mechanisms protecting minority rights). A consensus democracy has a well-balanced executive-parties relationship and is federal. The more conditions fulfilled, the closer to a consensus democracy a government gets.
2.2 Quality of government (QOG)
Citing United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)’s guidelines for good governance (Sheng, n.d.), governance is ‘the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)’; QOG, or ‘good governance’, can be defined by the following eight major characteristics:
Participation: Good governance involves (1) ‘freedom of association and expression’: i.e. the unrestrained freedom of expression and participation in politics accessible to all members of society, without exception or exclusion, directly or through institutions or representatives; and (2) ‘organized civil society’, i.e. ‘informed and organized’ participation.
Rule of law: Good governments should strictly follow a rule of law: enforce impartial legal frameworks that entail the ‘full protection of human rights’, including and ‘particularly’ including minorities; as well as an independent judiciary.
Transparency: Transparent governments strictly follow rules and regulations when making and enforcing political decisions, and make sufficient information available to the public about political decision-making processes (i.e. no ‘agency loss’ from asymmetric information).
Responsiveness: Responsive governments respond to demands of society or political stakeholders ‘within reasonable timeframe’.
Consensus oriented: Consensus-oriented governments should encourage ‘mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus […] on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved’. Consensus-orientedness also involves considering the perspective of sustainable human development and long-term planning.
Equity and inclusiveness: Equitable, inclusive governments should ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it, particularly vulnerable groups.
Effectiveness and efficiency: Effective, efficient governments make the most optimal and ‘sustainable’ use of resources to ‘produce results that meet [all of] the needs of society’.
Accountability: The government, (and even) private sector and civil society organizations should all be accountable/fully responsible to the public and stakeholders; the enforcement of such accountability is required by upholding transparency and the rule of law
3. Argument
Consensus democracy can improve QOG as the features of consensus democracy are congruent with, and often promote, the features of good QOG. First and foremost, consensus-orientedness is one of the features of good QOG encompassed in its definition, suggesting consensus democracy inherently signifies good QOG.
Secondly, consensus democracy promotes equitable, inclusive participation. PR promotes participation as it promotes equitable participation and counteracts disproportionality, while constitutional rigidity safeguards the right to vote for all members of society without potential for exclusion. Multi-party systems promote equity and inclusiveness, representing a wider variety of different interests and values among different societal stakeholders, while corporatism allows pluralistic interest groups to formally engage in policy formation.
Thirdly, rule of law is upheld by the features of consensus democracy. Constitutional rigidity allows for governments to strictly and impartially follow a rule of law, while existence of judicial review is an indicator of an independent judiciary.
Fourthly, consensus democracy upholds transparency and accountability. The various power-sharing features of consensus democracy (i.e. independent central bank and judiciary, bicameralism, constitutional rigidity, executive-legislative power-sharing) holds branches of government accountable to one another, preventing agency loss from corruption, advancements of personal or political gain etc. and thus enabling high transparency.
Fifthly, consensus democracy may improve responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency of governments. The decentralization of powers and delegation of responsibilities to different branches of government, instead of a unitary operation, enables efficiency as officials may exercise expertise specific to their function of government.
However, it is not always the case that consensus democracy improves QOG. Consensus democracy may potentially lead to policy gridlock, slow decision-making processes, and compromises that dilute bold or necessary reforms. In some cases, consensus-based systems may be prone to maintaining the status quo rather than pursuing transformative changes. Additionally, the success of consensus democracy depends on the political culture, institutional design, and the willingness of political actors to genuinely engage in dialogue and compromise.
4. Empirical Analysis
Data analysis is conducted on the Lijphart dataset. To represent consensus democracy, I have selected the executive-parties and federal-unitary variables. The executive-parties variable accounts for criteria 1-5 of the definition for consensus democracy, while the federal-unitary variable accounts for criteria 6-10. Scores are given from -2 to +2, where higher scores mean alignment with consensus democracy. I have selected the average value for 1981-2010 instead of 1945-2010, as (1) it is more recent and thus more relevant; (2) it aligns better with the timeframes of the QOG variables. Detailed descriptions can be found in the Appendix (7.1).
To represent QOG, I have selected six variables which attempt to jointly encompass the eight principles of good governance, to be introduced in each subsection. Detailed descriptions for each variable can be found in Appendix (7.1).
Bivariate regression analysis is first run on each QOG variable against the executive-parties and federal-unitary variables separately, which is visualized in each subsection. The multiple R-squared values and p-values are obtained to determine strength and variance of correlation. A multivariate regression is not visualized below but is run, for which its outputs are accounted for in the last column of each table. Adjusted R-squared values are used instead. All values are given to 4s.f. where possible. The average values are then taken for regression analyses of all QOG variables. 4.1 Participation The participation principle is represented by the ‘Voice and accountability’ [48] variable, measuring citizens’ ability to ‘participate in selecting their government, as well as freedoms of expression, association, and the press’. Scores are the averages for 1996-2009, and scaled to run from -2.5 to +2.5, where higher numbers represent greater democratic freedoms.
4.1 Participation
The participation principle is represented by the ‘Voice and accountability’ [48] variable, measuring citizens’ ability to ‘participate in selecting their government, as well as freedoms of expression, association, and the press’. Scores are the averages for 1996-2009, and scaled to run from -2.5 to +2.5, where higher numbers represent greater democratic freedoms.
4.2 Rule of law
The rule of law principle is represented by the ‘Rule of law’ [28] variable. Scores are the averages for 1996-2009, and scaled to run from -2.5 to +2.5, where higher numbers represent stronger rule of law.
4.3 Transparency
The transparency principle is represented by the ‘Control of corruption’ [29] variable, measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Scores are the averages for 1996-2009, and scaled to run from -2.5 to +2.5, where higher numbers represent greater control of corruption (i.e. less corruption).
4.4 Responsiveness
The responsiveness principle cannot be aptly captured by a singular variable in the Lijphart dataset; however, it could be reflected in the ‘government effectiveness’ variable, for which its analysis will be presented in section 4.7.
4.5 Consensus oriented
The consensus-oriented principle is represented by the ‘satisfaction with democracy’ [66] variable. Countries’ response to the question ‘How democratically is [your] country being governed today?’ on a scale of 1-10 (10 being most democratic), as a % of those surveyed who gave a score of 8 or higher, is plotted against consensus democracy measures. Responses of 19 of 36 democracies from 2005-07 were measured.
4.6 Equity and inclusiveness
The equity-and-inclusiveness principle is represented by the ‘political participation’ [52] variable. Ranges from 0-10, with higher values indicating greater and more equitable levels of political participation.
4.7 Effectiveness and efficiency
The effectiveness-and-efficiency principle is represented by the ‘government effectiveness’ [26] variable. The variable measures an average score ranging -2.5 to +2.5 from 1996-2009, with higher numbers signifying more effective government and vice versa.
4.8 Accountability
Accountability is accounted for by section 4.2 and 4.3.
4.9 Summary
5. Conclusion
Overall, a weak positive relationship (R-squared ≈ 0.172, p ≈ 0.02824) can be drawn between the executive-parties dimension and variables representing high QOG.
However, no correlation (R-squared ≈ 0.1238, p ≈ 0.08028) can be statistically drawn between the federal-unitary dimension, although when viewing the graph, a positive trend can be seen skewed by two constant outliers − India and Argentina. There also exists a cluster of countries (New Zealand, Great Britain, Luxembourg and Scandinavian countries) with a high quality of government but a low federal-unitary score.
On the whole, a weak positive relationship can be seen between consensus democracy and quality of government across both dimensions of consensus democracy, although statistically insignificant.
The empirical findings of the study imply that while consensus democracy can improve QOG by offering a system of accountability and upholding inclusiveness, participation and transparency, it is not a guaranteed safeguard against corruption, inefficiency that may be in place due to other factors, whether socio-economic, historical, political or institutional (e.g. India and Argentina). Areas for further research may investigate the effects of such factors. Findings also imply that high-quality governments can exist in non-consensus democracies (e.g. the ‘cluster’).
